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I .  THE K E Y  CONCEPTS OF ANALYSIS 
Analysis as an independent division of mathematics-and i t  is the largest 
division by far-is a "modern" creation. Greek antiquity did not have it, 
nor did the Middle Ages, except for occasional gropings, mostly faint ones. 
But in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, analysis began to sprout and 
rise in many contexts, and its influence began t o  spread into the farthest 
precincts of mathematics. All this started very suddenly, and it was as great 
a revolution as any then proliferating. 
The emergence of analysis in the Renaissance created a great divide in all 
of mathematics; there is a pre-analysis geometry and a post-analysis geome- 
try; a pre-analysis algebra and a post-analysis algebra; a pre-analysis num- 
ber thory and a post-analysis number theory, very much so; and, very im- 
portantly, a pre-analysis astronomy and a post-analysis astronomy. The 
first epochal manifestation of analysis-as analysis is conceived by us-was 
Johannes Kepler's proclamation of his Planetary Laws, especially the Law 
of Areas. There had been nothing like it before in an astronomy that had 
12 RICE UNIVERSITY STUDIES 
been a mathematically controlled science for two millennia, not even in Co- 
pernicus, whatever his astronomical innovations may have been. 
Terminologically the Greeks did have analysis, in logic, in epistemology, 
and also in (late) mathematics, but for the most part in a contrasting paral- 
lelism with synthesis, and only rarely by itself. The verb analyein occurs al- 
ready in Homer in the meaning of 'untie, unravel,' and a contrast between 
analysis (Resolutio) and synthesis (Coi7iposifio) plays a role in philosophy 
even today. Yet "analysis" and "analysis-synthesis" play only a secondary 
role in Greek mathematics, as can be gathered from the article of Mahoney 
[55], although this article is designed to  present and elaborate the positive 
aspects of the Greek analysis. In any event, in mathematics this analysis was 
something procedural rather than substantive, as described in a famous pas- 
sage in the work of the mathematician Pappus (third century A.D.), which is 
the principal ancient description known; see [55, p. 3221. Mahoney himself 
states: 
~f the Creeks admitted analysis as a member of the family, they nevertheless had tr~ecl to 
keep it In the background, barr~rig ~t from any formal appearance. Only Pappus and a 
tew scliol~asts talked about it at any length. [56, p. 351 
In Euclid's Elements there is no mention of analysis nor even any allusion to  
it, except for a statement on analysis-synthesis which appears after theorem 
X111.5, and which, as everybody agrees, is a scholiast's interpolation. After 
Euclid, there are occurrences in Archimedes, Apollonius, and perhaps 
others, but always quite secondary ones, and from the Middle Ages there is 
nothing remarkable known about "analysis." But in 1591 matters came to 
life, terminologically and substantively, in work of the algebraist F r a n ~ o i s  
Vi6te (1540-1603), who may have been stimulated by Petrus Ramus 
(1 505-1 572) (see Mahoney [56, pp. 11 -321, passim). Vi?te put "analysis" in- 
to the title of a book (In arten? analyticam isagoge, Introduction into the an- 
alytic art), thus creating a fashion in terminology. "AnalyticJ' and "analy- 
sis" began to appear frequently in titles of publications, and we will adduce 
noteworthy instances in due course. Substantively, the aim of Viste's 
isagoge was to develop techniques for operating with algebraic symbols 
(which was Viste's forte), and it clearly associated "analysis" with this en- 
deavor. This also created a fashion. Many mathematicians began to be 
known as "analysts"; Fermat for instance so designated himself, as a mat- 
ter of course. But there were no  "synthesists," probably because they 
would not have been very different from "classical" geometers. Besides, 
"analysis" was quickly exceeding the bounds within which ViGte had con- 
ceived it, and it soon began to designate most of the genuinely new mathe- 
matics bursting forth all around. 
Thus Isaac Newton's first leading essay on mathematics proper, which 
was conceived and composed in various parts between 1665 and 1669-but 
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not published until 171 1-was avowedly in analysis. Its title is "De analysi 
per aequationes infinitas" (Analysis by infinire equations), and at  one point 
he refers to  Descartes as an  analyst (see [61, p. 2221). Yet on  the title page 
of his great Principia he  speaks of "mathematics," which in the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries also subsumed mathematically controlled science, 
especially astronomy. The full title of the work is Philosophicre naturalis 
principia rnathetnutica (Mathematical principles of natural philosophy), 
and on  its title page Newton identifies himself as Lucasian Professor of 
"Mathesis." Still, in the Scholium to the Laws of Motion, he  refers to "Sir 
Christopher Wren, Dr. Wallis, and Mr. Huygens" as "the greatest geom- 
eters of our time" (see f61, p. 22]), just as, in the French language, the en- 
comiastic designation "illustre giomirtre" may refer to a distinguished 
mathematician of any research proclivity. 
But what was this new analysis, and how did it relate to the algebra of 
symbols and to the infinitesimal calculus, which were such "obvious" man- 
ifestations of it? Our answer is that t he  operation with symbols was a kind 
of new technology, and that the infinitesimal calculus was a kind of auto- 
mation based on it, but that analysis in a broad sense was a novel intellec- 
tual setting in which all this came to pass, and in which operational and 
foundational aspects were inseparable. The new setting was foreshadowed 
in Nicholas of Cusa (1401-1464) in the first half of  the fifteenth century, but 
it actually formed itself in the sixteenth century, when rather suddenly, a s  if 
on  a signal, mathematics began to  absorb into its very texture conceptions 
which are the all and everything of mathematics of today, but which had 
been quite alien to Greek maftlernatics even a t  its height, as in the work of 
Archimedes, say. The leading such conceptions were: Space, Infinity, F ~ i n c -  
tion, Continuity, Real Numbers. These conceptions d o  occur, overtly or co- 
vertly, in certain areas of Greek thought, as in natural philosophy, cosmol- 
ogy, ontology, logic, and, very importantly, theology. But it is very difficult 
t o  locate them in Greek professional mathematics. 
It is a fact, however hard to  accept, that Creek geometry-Greece's 
pride-was a geometry without space. The  geometry of Euclid did not have 
the "Euclidean" spaces E' or  E3, as objects by themselves, independent of 
or prior t o  configuration contained in them. There is, however, a separate 
essay on space (or rather o n  place, fopos) in Aristotle's Physics, book 4, 
chapters 1-5 (compare, for instance, [3]), and a separate one on void, chap- 
ters 6-9. There is also, in close proximity, an essay on  infinity, book 3, chap- 
ters 4-8, and on time, book 4, chapters 10-13. But there is nothing sylIogistic 
about infinity in Greek mathematics, or  about continuity, and these have 
been the intellectual's hallmarks of Time, from Hclmer to Newton and be- 
yond (see below, section VII). 
Our key conceptions, although distinct from each other, cannot be kept 
apart in meaningful contexts. Aristotle knew this too. H e  knew that they 
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come close together in the conception of motion, and he made great efforts 
to comprehend their interaction in the second half of the Physics, books 
5-8. He was especially intrigued by the puzzles of Zeno of Elea (dichotomy, 
Achilles and the tortoise, the flying arrow, the race-course) and made great 
efforts to resolve them [25]. But there is absolutely no mention of the puz- 
zles in Greek mathematics, which apparently did not profit at all from phil- 
osophical developments towards elucidating them. For instance, there is no- 
thing evidential in the extant corpus of Greek writings to suggest that Archi- 
medes was interested in the puzzles, or even that he knew about them or 
knew who Zeno of Elea had been. A reader may recoil in disbelief from the 
supposition that Archimedes could have been totally unaware of such devel- 
opments in philosophy and of their potential import for mathematics, but 
the possibility must be faced. The greaL reluctance to entertain such a "neg- 
ative" supposition about an Archimedes stems from a presumption that 
Greek professional mathematics was still close to philosophy, closer than it 
is today. But this presumption is not justified. I t  is true that Eudoxus of 
Cnidus, a great mathematician and member of Plato's Academy, could ap- 
parently lecture on Plato's Theory of Forms, and (according to Aristotle, 
Nichoinachean Ethics, book X )  was even an expert on problems of ethics. 
But, in Plato's dialogue "Theaetetus," Theodorus of Cyrene-a distin- 
guished mathematician, teacher to Plato and Theaetetus-is reluctant to 
participate in the discussion of the nature of Knowledge, pleading a lack of 
competence in the field. Also, it is true that the system of Definitions, Pos- 
tulates, and Common Notions, on which Euclid's Elements is built, was 
originally debated by philosophers and mathematicians alike (see 142, pp. 
114-1361). But there is little evidence for such a continued "cooperation" 
after Euclid; and, very importantly, Archimedes, for instance, showed al- 
most no regard for principles and niceties of the system, in sharp contrast to 
Poincari, Hilbert, L.E.J. Brouwer, or Hermann Weyl of our times (see the 
thorough-going investigation [38] in its entirety, and especially a critique of 
Archimedes on p. 57). It is misleading to judge the relation between philos- 
ophy and professional mathematics in antiquity by Plato's aphorism that 
God is a Geometer and his conceit of intervening in matters of professional 
mathematics (Republic, vii). 
The key concepts of analysis are in their roots common to mathematics 
and other knowledge, general or particular, and, to a considerable extent, 
analysis had to wrench them by a very slow process of adaptation out of 
their extra-mathematical contexts and fit them to its peculiar molds. I t  is 
this genetic universality of the key conceptions of analysis that made mod- 
ern mathematics so very efficacious in interpreting nature and knowledge, 
much more so than Greek mathematics ever was or could be. The "tools" 
of Greek mathematics were by origin narrowly mathematical. Those of 
modern mathematics, however, are geneticaily universal; and the more uni- 
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versa1 by origin, the more effective they are in mathematics after becoming 
attuned to its needs and purposes, 
11. THE FORCE OF ANALYSIS 
It is our thesis that the era of the emergence of analysis is virtually coex- 
tensive with the Era of the Scientific Revolution in its full duration; that the 
emergence of analysis was an all-dominant outcome of the Revolution; and 
that the one-ness of analysis instills a feature of one-ness into the Scientific 
Revolution, whatever its diversity. 
The Scientific Revolution spans the three centuries 1500-1800 (see [39]), 
even the four centuries 1400-1800 (compare [24]).  There is nothing uncer- 
tain about the terminal date 1800; in particular, in our outIook, we would 
not replace it by an earlier date, although the eighteenth century is a 
renowned age by itself, the Age of Enlightenment (see [28]). But the begin- 
ning date of the Scientific Revolution is flexible. The century 1400-1500 was 
not as "revolutionary" as the following one, although it brought about two 
separate achievements both seriously altering our key conception of space. 
It systematically initiated linear perspective in painting (see [37]) ,  and, in 
forwards-directed pronouncements of Nicholas of Cusa, it inititated "mod- 
ern" insights into the spatial fabric of the universe [49 and 171. 
It is an essential part of my thesis that the three centuries 1500-1800 in the 
rise of modern mathematics "genetically" correspond to the three centuries 
500-200 B.C. in the rise of Creek mathematics, and the four-century span 
1400-1 800 similarly corresponds to 600-200 B.C., but that this genetic corres- 
pondence breaks down after the terminal dates, totally and irretrievably. 
In the century 300-200 B.C., just before the terminal date, Creek mathe- 
matics was in its fullest vigor. The century began with Euclid's Elements, 
ended with the Conics of Apollonius, and culminated with the works of Ar- 
chimedes, who was one of the very greatest mathematicians ever. The cen- 
tury could also boast of the great astronomer Aristarchus of Samos, who 
was even a heliocentrist (according to a statement of Archimedes), and of 
the polymath Eratosthenes of Cyrene, eminent mathematician (Sieve of 
Eratosthenes) and even more eminent geographer. But, as I stated elsewhere 
[12], after 200 B.c., "unexpectedly and inexplicably, as if on a signal," the 
upward trend of mathematics proper, that is, of mathematics as "research" 
mathematics, came almost to a halt. The development of mathematics "be- 
gan to level off, to lose its impetus, and then to falter." An inexorable 
downward trend set in, which even the imposing figure of a Pappus (third 
century A.D.) could not stem; and around A.D.  500, that is, around the time 
of the fall of Rome, came the final extinction of Creek mathematics in its 
own phase. 
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To an extent, the decline of Greek mathematics was part of the so-called 
decline of ancient civilization, many features of which began to manifest 
themselves in the second century B.C. But (see [12]) the decline of mathema- 
tics from the heights of the third century B.c. was too large, too sudden, and 
too incongruous to be thus fully explained, and an additional cause peculiar 
to mathematics must have been operative. I maintained (in [12]) that, from 
first to last, the intellectual base of Greek mathematics was altogether too 
narrow and, above all, too rigidly fixed in its intellectual narrowness to sup- 
port an ever heavier mathematical edifice; so that at a certain critical stage 
the edifice ceased to be firmly grounded. It gradually became unstable, frac- 
tured, decadent. 
A glance at the fortunes of astronomy will corroborate this outlook. The 
mathematically controlled astronomy of the Greeks did continue to thrive 
after 200 B.C. Around 150 B.C. Hipparchus made the breathtaking discov- 
ery of the precession of the equinoxes, and three centuries later, around A.D. 
150, Claudius Ptolemy composed his Almagest, which, by mathematical 
formalism, held sway over astronomy not only through the length of the 
medieval Islamic Era, but still in the structural framework of Copernicus7s 
De Revolutionibus, howeyer "revolutionary'' its astronomical content may 
have been. This perdurance of the Altnagest is due not so much to its great- 
ness as to the general stagnation of the Greek mathematics employed. As 
soon as, after Copernicus, the breath of the new analysis blew into astron- 
omy, it produced the unprecedented Planetary Laws of Kepler, and his new 
Theory of Vision to boot (see below, section V). Also, not long afterwards, 
whatever is worth remembering of the work of the Late Hellenistic mathe- 
matician Pappus was enhanced by dosages of analysis-directly in the n-line 
locus problem of Descartes, and indirectly in the Perspective of Kepler and 
Desargues. 
After that, until 1800, analysis was in a state of prolonged adolescent 
growth, as it were, whence comes an impression of freshness, robustness, 
and inimitable prowess; and the progress of this growing-up can be gauged 
by a quick assessment of several works which carry "analysis'' in the title. 
First, we have already noted Newton's work of 1665-1669 on "analysis by 
infinite equations." It deals with an array of infinite processes, mainly with 
infinite series for various definite and indefinite integrals, and successive 
applications of his method of approximation to solutions of polynomial 
equations. 
Second, in 1748, came Euler's most popular treatise among his many 
popular ones, under the title "Introduction into analysis of infinitude" (In- 
troductio in analysin infinitorurn), and it is already a veritable grab-bag of 
analysis of today. It contains, among other things, an exposition of infinite 
series, including those for I?, cos x, sin x, and the relation e'" = cos x -t i 
sin x; curves and surfaces investigated with the aid of their equations; an al- 
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gebraic theory of elimination; and, mark! a chapter on the Zeta function 
and its relation to the prime number theorem, as well as a chapter on parti- 
rio numerorum (see [71, p. 1691). 
Next, four decades after Euler7s "Analysis," in 1786, came Lagrange's 
Mbcanique Analyfique (Analytical Mechanics), which was a new kind of ti- 
tle. Whatever Lagrange himself and his immediate contempories may have 
associated with this "analytique," in retrospect i t  does not connote a con- 
trast to something else, like synthetical, practical, or pragmatic, but simply 
the presentation of mechanics in the spirit, ambience, and style of La- 
grange's "today." It almost means "modern" mechanics, mechanics of 
"today." And i t  was a long "today," because Lagrange's treatise was a 
paradigm for textbooks in coileges and universities until World War I. Also 
only ten years after the Mkanique Analytiqtte, in 1795, Monge began to 
publish his Feuilles d'analyse (that is, "Notes" in analysis), which later be- 
came the famed Application d'analyse a la gebtne'trie, which promulgated a 
new kind of geometry, an avant garde geometry based on analysis, not at all 
replacing the "classical" geometry, but becoming a novel field alongside 
the latter. 
Lagrange's Mechanics came precisely a hundred years after Newton's 
Principia, and by contents it is, in a sense, a translation of the Principia 
from the ostensibly Archimedean mise-en-seine into an up-to-date setting 
of analysis. But the Principia was its basis, foundation, and fount of inspi- 
ration, so  that in innermost substance the Principia must have anticipated 
the "analytical" character of the Mechanics. Such was indeed the case. We 
will verify that, from our outlook, the Principia is simply soaked in analy- 
sis, which is of the same substance as in Lagrange's Mechanics, and which 
had been in the making from the first. Nevertheless, syllogistically, at the 
time of the Principia, analysis was still in a state of juvenile un-readiness, 
which the Archimedean setting of the Principia masks and counteracts in 
one, I argued this already (in 11 A),  and the emphasis there was on the fact 
that Kepler's analysis was in an even earlier state of infancy, but that this 
state of infancy in no wise impaired its power and efficacy. 
Even Lagrange's work on "Analytic Funtions" (Fonctionsanalytiques) is 
syllogistically still very wobbly. In fact, the maturing of analysis (and of 
modern mathematics as a whole) into a syllogistically acceptable doctrine 
began only after 1800, and the process extended till 1900 and beyond. 
The era of the Scientific Revolution contains diverse and disparate devel- 
opments, but the extramathematical universality of the key concepts of 
analysis suggests that there ought to be internal features of unity within the 
diversity, and there are indeed. For instance, Kepler calls his optical work 
"astronomiae pars optica," thus insisting on a link with his astronomy. 
Kepler himself does not suggest what the link is, and Alexandre Koyr6 in his 
Rivolution Astronomique [50], a splendid book about Kepler by-and-large, 
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does not enter into optics at all. But there is indeed such a link, namely 
through the key conception of Space, as we will see in section V. I will even 
@ace Descartesians) suggest such a link in Descartes, namely a link between 
his geometry and his body-and-soul problem. Here again I found nothing 
about i t  in Koyre', although he wrote two important books about Descartes 
[47 and 481, in addition t o  expounding his work in mechanics. But I did 
find encouraging corroboration in the basic essay of Ernst Cassirer [28], es- 
pecially in its last chapter. 
In the eighteenth century analysis and mechanics were almost inseparable 
in their growth, but after 1800 they began to separate, although in a very 
amicable way; and, what is more remarkable, a concern for a syllogistically 
rigorous foundation of analysis began to spread, however gradually, into 
ever wider circles of  creative mathematicians. Analogous concerns sprang 
up in virtually all academic fields. In historical sciences, for instance, a con- 
cern for rigorous foundation resulted in the emergence of a so-called "high- 
er criticism" (see 191). There seems to be no satisfactory explanation for this 
"universal" development. 
Similarly, in the unfolding of the key concepts of analysis since 1800 there 
has been an overall difference between the nineteenth and twentieth centu- 
ries, which again appears to have analogs in most other academic depart- 
ments. The difference is that gradually a certain "secuIarization" of the key 
concepts, followed by a certain "flattening-out," has come about. Space, 
f o ~  instance, in the hands of Riemann became something intricately lofty in 
two separate grandiose constructions, namely construction of a Riemann 
surface in complex analysis-or, rather, to Riemann, in algebraic geome- 
try-and of a general Hausdorff manifold with or without a Riemannian 
metric. These are structures as lofty as cathedrals. But a secularized class of 
spaces nowadays, indispensable, yet very "flat," and, to me "vulgar," are 
the various linear vector spaces, which are mushrooming all over mathemat- 
ics with no end in sight. Also, space in cosmology and reIativity is highly 
"structured," and is becoming ever more so. On the other hand, almost any 
aggregate of mathematical objects, or  alternately any "point-set" can be 
viewed as a space, even if no kind of structure is postulated to begin with. 
Or consider continuity. After Cantor and Dedekind had finally settled the 
nature of reaI numbers and of the linear continuirrti in one, the nature of 
continuous funcfions followed next. They were explained as continuous 
mappings from one topological space into another, and until around 1935 
topology was dominated by the quest to elucidate the implications. It was 
all very exciting. But the sobering "secularization" set in, when "topoIogi- 
cal structure" of a space was made something very general, subject to some 
minimal requirements only. Any point-set whatsoever could be given a top- 
ological structure without having one, namely the so-calIed discrete struc- 
ture. Finally, infinity, which had been highIy theological throughout, and 
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still was an  awe-inspiring conception in the nineteenth century, became 
quite vulgarized in this sense. For instance, any linearly ordered set whatso- 
ever can be enlarged by a fictitious last element, which is irreverently called 
infinite, and denoted by + a, say; o r  it can be deprived of it, which is 
equally irreverent. 
111. FUNCTIONS 
The emphasis on operation with symbols in Viste and  Fermat undoubted- 
ly had an  impact on the rise of functions and of real numbers, because the 
simplest kinds of functions are those given by algebraic expressions in terms 
of symbols, and real numbers are the simplest "constant" coefficients that 
are eIements o f  an  algebraic field or  ring. But functions and real numbers 
also had "analytical" roots of their own, which were not intergrown with 
symbols, reaching back into the sixteenth century and earlier. 
Outwardly, functions unfolded rather slowly. According to Moritz Can- 
tor's History of Mathematics, the systematic conception of functions began 
only near 1700 with Leibniz, who also coined the name "function." But, 
syllogistically, it was a rather crude "approximation" to our y = f (x)  of to- 
day; in the eighteenth century there were several attempts to  d o  better, but 
progress was slow. Even Lagrange's book, Fonctions analytiques, which 
was composed toward the very end of the eighteenth century, is not, or  not 
yet, what an  unwary reader today would expect. It does have power series 
and their usual properties. But to Lagrange an  analytic function was one ap- 
propriate for his analysis, and this was the analysis involved in his Analyti- 
cal Mechanics; thus he  was not "programmed" to  distinguish between a 
function which is analytic in our present-day sense and one that is, say, con- 
tinuous and piecewise analytic only. As a matter of fact, Lagrange knew 
that in the mechanics of continuous media (vibrating strings, etc.), a "gen- 
eral'' solution can be obtained approximately by replacing continuously dis- 
tributed masses by finite systems of mass points, and he may have therefore 
taken it for granted that a (uniform) limit of such piecewise analytic func- 
tions (in our sense) is analytic (in his sense) too. Cauchy was probably the 
first successor to  Lagrange who could clearly perceive the distinction. La- 
grange and Cauchy were in the same French tradition, and chronologically 
not too  far apart. But Lagrange was active before 1800 and Cauchy after 
1800, and the difference between them is a telling manifestation of the 
change-over around 1800. T o  Lagrange a mathematical function, however 
"general" and "abstract," is somehow always an  orbit from mechanics; 
but to  Cauchy any path o r  orbit from mechanics, any mechanics, is a math- 
ematical function, as a matter of course. 
Unlike power series expansions, trigonometric expansions are suitable for 
very "general" functions. This was emphatically proclaimed by Fourier, 
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who was active after Lagrange and before Cauchy, and who asserted that 
"any" function admits a trigonometric expansion, even if it is "absolument 
arbitraire." This provoked Dirichlet into defining, in 1837, a general furTc- 
tion y = f(x) essentially as an "arbitrary" association of a suitable value y 
with any valuex; and the priority of Dirichlet in this matter has been "insti- 
tutionalized" by A. Pringsheim [64] in the German Encyclopedia of Mathe- 
matics. But in another volume of the Encyclopedia, H .  Burkhardt 1231, 
author of an article which is a fundamental work in the "early" history of 
Fourier Analysis, states that the twentieth-century conception of a general 
function originated in the remarkable book (1838) of Antoine Augustin 
Cournot, Recherches sur Ies principes ~nathejnatiques des richesses (Investi- 
gation of the mathematical principles of the theory of wealths). The "Cal- 
culus" work [62] by A. Ostrowski, which has competent historical notes, 
agrees with Burkhardt. It should be stated though, that, in a serious vein, a 
"function" cannot be really defined at all, because any description of i t  as a 
"correspondence" or "association," or even "ordered binary relation," is 
logically a vicious circle. 
After this very brief survey of the overt career of functions since their for- 
mal introduction by Leibniz in 1700, we shall turn to their covert presence 
before 1700. 
I find that, covertly, functions are in the very center of Newton's Prin- 
cipia, which appeared in 1686 but had been long in the making. Newton's 
primary concept is "quantity of motion." If he had had formulas, then for 
the motion of a particle on the line, x = cp(t), the quantity of motion would 
be 
And Newton's primaryfact is that the rate of change of the quantity of mo- 
tion is (equal to, or is determined by, or, perhaps even determines) the total 
force acting on the mass point, that is, in terms of (I),  
In the case of a brusquely acting force, one might also have 
ap = p ( t  + 0) - p ( t  - 0) = ~ ( t ) .  
There is nothing like all this in Greek mathematics, in any kind of verbal 
circumIocution of these formulas. We might concede that a point function 
p(t) is reminiscent of a Greek curve, and chat a derivative @ at a point is d/ 
reminiscent of the tangent to a curve at a point. But gathering up the deriva- 
tives at various points into a new function v(t) is not reminiscent of anything 
occurring in Greek mathematics anywhere, and the formation of the second 
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derivate of p(t), which occurs in (2) when writing it in Euler's form 
is far outside anything Greek thought has ever conceived. (We note that 
Euler's form (3) was very important in the creation of the theory of elliptic 
operators, But Newton's form (2) occurs in most theories of physics after 
Euler, in the Hamilton-Jacobi theory of Mechanical Systems with Re- 
straints; in the theories of Gas Dynamics of Maxwell and  Boltzman; in the 
theory of Relativity; and in Quantum Mechanics.) 
But even the concession that the derivative * is reminiscent of a Greek 
clr 
tangent to a curve goes too far. From what is known, the Greeks envisaged 
tangents to curves that are convex, at least locally, and only to these, s o  that 
their tangents were supporting lines, a t  least locally (see [12, p. 1841). They 
apparently never introduced a tangent which crosses the curve at  the point 
of tangency, although some of the curves known to  them had such tangents. 
In fact it was one  of Fermat's major achievements to have become aware of 
such a possibility. In 1640 he envisaged, as a part of his pioneering work on  
maxima and minima of functions, the problem "of investigating by the 
(analytic) art the points of inflection at which the curvature changes from 
convex to concave, and conversely" (see [56, p. 2011). Fermat thus created 
the concepts of a "point of inflection" of a curve, and of the "(point-by- 
point) curvature" of the curve, which Frenet and others took u p  systemati- 
cally only in the nineteenth century. 
This achievement o f  Fermat belongs to  the "theory of functions" irre- 
spective of the geometric setting, and earlier achievements affecting func- 
tions also appeared in settings that were not overtly "analytic." Functions 
in our sense are discernible already in the fourteenth century-as a species 
of graph and other-in the work o f  Nicole Oresme (1325-1382); and the re- 
nowned mathematician-turned-historian Oswald Spengler was s o  impressed 
with them that he made them into a litmus-like indicator by which to distin- 
guish present-day civilization from ancient ones. 
In  the fifteenth century Regiomontanus created a field in function theory 
by freeing trigonometry from its subordination to  geometry and astronomy 
and by beginning (but only beginning) to  view sin x and cos x as functions 
on the x-axis subject to  the familiar addition theorems as functional equa- 
tions. Later o n  the logarithmic and exponential functions were also drawn 
into this context. 
Simon Stevin shortly before 1600, a n d  Luca Valerio in 1604, began to 
consider rather general functions when standardizing and streamlining the 
formation of "Riemann-Darboux Sums" for the computation of volumes, 
which for  special functions already occur in the masterful work of Archime- 
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des on Conoids and Spheroids. Thus Carl Boyer comments on Luca Vale- 
rio: "this geometrical reasoning is strikingly similar to that presented in 
many present-day elementary textbooks on the calculus" [22, p. 1051. I ful- 
ly concur, except that I would have said "analytical" rather than "geomet- 
rical" reasoning. And all this was done without Vigte symbolism, which, in 
similar contexts, does not occur before the work of Fermat. 
In denying the creation of functions to the Greeks, I d o  not mean to  say 
that they were not familiar with categories of cognition such as "correspon- 
dence," "dependence," "mapping," even "binary relation," without 
which "functions" cannot be formally conceived, but only that they did not 
perform mathematically controlled operations with them, in symbols or  in 
words. Loosely conceived functions become mathematical objects in ear- 
nest when they a re  subjected t o  manipulations which are recognizably math- 
ematical, in symbols or  verbal circumlocutions. It is this that the Greeks did 
not achieve. 
IV.  REAL NUMBERS 
The Greeks could not or  would not form the product of two genera1 real 
numbers. Archimedes did not form it. The Renaissance quickly did it, and 
the consequences are all around us. 
As is done even today, the Greeks represented real numbers by the 
(lengths) of rectilinear segments in the plane, and when Greek mathematics 
was at  its height it had a (vague) notion that there are as many real numbers 
as there are  (incongruent) segments. The addition of real numbers was obvi- 
ous: segment was followed by segment. But for a product o f  two segments, 
the factor segments invoked the image of a rectangle whose sides they were, 
and  the Greeks could not or would not "convert" the rectangle quantita- 
tively into a new segment. This blockage created a stand-off for two thou- 
sand years. 
O n  a n  early page of his Geometry (1637), Descartes performed the con- 
version as follows: by similar triangles, the equation 
determines any of the four magnitudes in terms of the other three. But now 
standardize one of them as  a unit, say d = 1. Then 
performs the multiplication of b,c, thus a = be. Zeuthen, in his important 
work [75], celebrates this calculation as a crucial achievement, and  Ma-  
honey [56, p. 441, sees in this "bold" move a triumph of the analytic art. 
The fact of the matter is that all this had been achieved-standardized 
unit and all-long before Vi;te, let alone Fermat and Descartes, in the 
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famed Algebra of Raffael Bombelli (1530- after 1572), in a part of it that 
was published in 1929 by Ettore Bortolotti [19], but had been unedited till 
then. In one of the theorems, by putting b = 1 in (4) Bombelli performs the 
division a = c/d,  and in another theorem he expressly forms for any real 
number a ,  its successive powers a', a', a', . . . , for any exponent wanted. 
Any history of mathematics quotes Bombelli, but  only Bourbaki [20] re- 
ports this capital achievement of his. All the others praise him for his antici- 
pation of the fact that for any real numbers a ,b  the expression 
( a  + b &'i)'/3 + ( a  - b m)"3 is real-valued. This is a striking enough 
achievement, but in doing this Bombelli was working in the area of many 
other contemporary mathematicians. In shaping real numbers into a semi- 
ring he was ahead of them. 
But why was this s o  important? And what were the consequences? The 
importance and consequences were that with multiplication of real numbers 
at  his command Isaac Newton could resume where Archimedes had left off 
nineteen centuries before. 
Of course in everyday life the Greeks could and did multiply numbers; 
carpenters, masons, builders, and engineers could not have done without it. 
What they could not or  would not d o  was to multiply the numerical values 
of two physical quantities of heterogeneous physical provenance and there- 
by obtain the numerical value of the quantity of a third physical species. As 
I have maintained from the first [7, p. 1821, the crucial evidence for this is 
Archimedes' own formulation of his law of  the lever in equilibrium. He  ex- 
pressed it by the proportion L ,  : L2 = PZ : PL where L , ,  L,  are the lengths 
of the two arms of the lever, and PI and  Pz are the magnitudes of the 
weights suspended from them. But he  was apparently unable t o  express it, 
by introducing the product L P, in the form 
let alone to create the conception of the "rotational momentum" L.P in 
the process, and to  interpret ( 5 )  as the sameness of the momentum for the 
two sides of the lever. 
But this is precisely the manner in which Isaac Newton did proceed. Me 
did form a product of heterogeneous factors, namely his quantity of motion 
and he did state that in the case of equilibrium it is constant in time. He  ful- 
ly knew that he broke new ground, and he described the  product (6 ) ,  entire- 
ly without symbols: 
TIie q~ranrrry of t?rotron 1s rhe tnrus~ire of the satne, urrsr~ig fro171 the velocity o t ~ d  
cluantity oft?~urrer corr~ornrly. 
The motlon of the whole IS  the sum of the motion, of all the parts; and therefore In a 
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body double  in quantity, with equal velocity, the  motion is double; with twtce the veloc- 
i ty,  ~t is quadruple. [60, p. 11 
Note that Newton is on the verge of describing the product (6) as a bilinear 
functional in (m,v), which is further evidence for my contention that the no- 
tion of function was fermenting inside the Principia. 
Many developments initiated by Newton were quite slow in unfolding (see 
[7, pp. 346-3481). Thus, only the nineteenth century extended the process of 
multiplication involved in (6) to physical magnitudes in general, creating 
such objects as 
[energy] = [M L' . T-'1 
and, say, ["action"] = [M L" TT-'1 ,
which is the dimension of Planck's universal constant 11. A first essay on 
this subject, short but systematic, was included in the Th60rie de 10 chaleur 
of J .  Fourier, and a much more systematic account was given by Clerk Max- 
we11 and Fleeming Jenkins in 1863 (see [7, pp. 21 1-2121). 
In the case of energy, Leibniz introduced a vis viva by inv', which is twice 
our kinetic energy, and historians of science are unappeasably puzzled by 
the fact that Newton himself did not introduce any kind of energy at all. 
Even one grotesque solution of the would-be puzzle has its audience (see [7, 
pp. 79-80]). The explanation of the "puzzle" is simply that Newton did not 
need the concept of energy operationally, and not needing it, he did not 
form it. In traditiona1 physics the concept of energy ariscs in two ways: I r  
arises in mechanics when variational principles are invoked, but Newton did 
not resort to such principles. And i t  is indispe~isable in physics proper, that 
is in theories of heat and electrodynamics, but Newton never dealt systema- 
tically with physics proper. Besides, quantity of motion, that is momenturn, 
which was Newton's central concept of mechanics, is mathematically more 
subtle than energy, because i t  is a vector whereas energy is a scalar. As I 
have stated previously-and found corroborated in M.J. Crowe [33, pp. 
127-1281-Newton was the actual creator of the conception of vector for ex- 
act science. "Several significant physical entities of the Principicr, namely 
velocities, momenta, and forces are, by mathematical structure, vectors, 
that is elements of vector fields, and vectorial composition and decomposi- 
tion of these entities constitute our universal scheme of the entire theory7' 
[7, p. 1921. 
But Newton did not introduce tensors, and so, in keeping with the general 
remark made above, only the nineteenth century was ready to create them. 
We have to return to the Creeks for two observations regarding multipli- 
cation: First, the Creeks did not arrive at the theorenl-and they would not 
have been able to formulate it-that any natural number is a (unique) prod- 
uct of primes, although they had a11 the "lemmas" at hand for doing so. 
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Even the Scientific Revolution itself was not yet ready for it, and the theo- 
rem surfaced only in 1801 in the "Disquisitiones Arithmeticae" of C.F. 
Gauss (see [7, p. 2161 and [ I S ,  p. 8281). Second, there is nowhere in Greek 
mathematics an anticipation of the group operation a. b = c; and, for my 
part, I would say that groups appear only in the work of Euler as groups of 
motion in 3-space, in his mechanics of rigid bodies. (But see also the book 
of Wussing [74].) 
Finally, the difficulty of multiplication was not the only obstacle that 
kept the Greeks from arriving at reaI numbers. There was also the fact that 
an escalation of abstractions would have been involved. Starting from natu- 
ral numbers, one must introduce the "cone" of positive fractions, extend it  
to the field of rational numbers by introducing zero and negative numbers, 
and last extend this to the field of real numbers by completion in the order 
topology. Now, as I have frequently stated before (see for instance [7, pp. 
51 ff]) the Greeks hardly ever went beyond mere ideations-that is, one-step 
abstractions, in and out of mathematics, and a veritable scale of abstrac- 
tions, a5 involved in the formation of real numbers, was beyond their reach. 
And may 1 add that when in modern mathematics Cardano and Bombelli in 
the sixteenth century ventured the first sallies into the realm of con~plex 
numbers, they did so long before ViSte symbolism became operative. Des- 
cartes, however, in the seventeenth century, who mastered the symbolism as 
expertly as any of his contemporaries, was one of those who still rejected 
complex numbers, coining the pejorative appellation "in~aginary" for 
them. 
V .  SPACE 
In our outlook, nothing separates ancient and modern mathematics more 
decisively and emphatically than the concept of space. Greek mathematics 
was a mathematics without space, all of it, but post-medieval mathematics 
was a mathematics with and by space from the very first. Mathematical 
space is a hallmark of analysis, and analysis was launched by it. Space was 
not an appurtenance of Greek mathematics, geometry or  other, but all ge- 
ometry since I600 has been molded in space and thus imbued with the spirit 
of analysis, the geometry of Desargues (1593-1662) just as much as the ge- 
ometry of Descartes (1596-1650), the so-called "synthetic" geometry of the 
nineteenth century just as much as the avowedly "analytical" one. 
The advent of mathematical space was heralded in the fifteenth century 
by the emergence of linear perspective in painting in the work of Alberti 
(1404-1472) (which was followed by beginnings of projective and descriptive 
geometry in the sixteenth century), and by the emergence of a mathemati- 
cally conceived spatial structure of the universe in the theology of Nicholas 
of Cusa (1401-1464). 
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In the middle of the sixteenth century there was a sudden change of 
course in Italian Renaissance Philosophy. It is hard to account for (see Kris- 
teller [51]).  The best known representative of the "New Directions" was 
Giordano Bruno (1540-1600), whose spectacular cosmological speculations 
became widely known. For our purposes it is more significant that in the 
work of Patritius (1529-1579) there appears the expression "mathematical 
space" in a chapter heading De spatio inathetnatico, and also the parallel 
expression "physical space." I cannot imagine Archimedes announcing a 
lecture or writing an essay "On mathematical space" or "On space in math- 
ematics." 
For us, the paramount achievement involving the rise of space in Renais- 
sance thought is the scientific effort of Johannes Kepler (1571-1630): his 
momentous Planetary Laws, his New Theory of Vision, and also his purely 
mathematical analysis of volumes (compare [13, 17, and 161). 
And now for some elaborations of the above. 
The Greeks did have space in physics, cosmology, and perhaps also theol- 
ogy, but not in logical, ontological, or psychological perception, and above 
all not in mathematics, where a modern reader would expect it first of all, 
There is no pre-existent mathematical background space for the configura- 
tions and constructs in the mathematical works of Euclid, Archimedes, or 
Apollonius of Perga, nor in the astronomical work of Ptolemy. In these 
works, as soon as a mathematicaI configuration or construction is envis- 
aged, an ambient space is evoked, but there is no Euclidean space E' or E3 
as a mathematical object in its own right, independent of configurations in 
it. When Ptolemy's Ali??agest designs a path of a celestial body, then the 
path lies in the astronomical universe of Ptolemy, but as a geometrical ob- 
ject of mathematical design and purpose it does not lie anywhere. In his 
work on the lever and on hydrostatic equilibrium, Archimedes does not 
have anything remotely resembling Newton's Space in the Principia, "abso- 
lute" or other. 
We will offer an explanation why there is no theorizing on perspective in 
the arts in Greek works, extant or known by title. Aristotle, for instance, 
who wrote something about almost everything, apparently never had a trea- 
tise on this subject matter. The explanation is simple. Perspective, whatever 
i t  be experientially and esthetically, is mathematically a mapping of E3 into 
EZ, and the Greeks, not having created these spaces, could not create such a 
mapping either. But the fifteenth century obviously did already have such 
spaces, and linear perspective could and did get under way. 1 think that my 
opinion is in accord with, or at least not at variance with, insights of the art 
historian Erwin Panofsky, who made searching studies about the rise of 
perspective in the West (see 137, chapter XI] and [63]). But most art histor- 
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ians (and other scholars) cannot believe and will not concede that the 
Greeks had not had linear perspective at  all. For instance, S.Y. Edgerton's 
very knowledgeable book 1371, from which I have quoted, is entitled "The 
Renaissance Rediscovery of Linear Perspective," as if it were reasonable to  
assume that a linear perspective had been known before, that is, in antiqui- 
ty. But there is no  evidence to support such an  assumption. 
In the early part of the fifteenth century, Cusanus, or  Nicholas of Cusa, 
the theologian-philosopher and  gifted mathematician mentioned above, has 
many intriguing philosophemes on Space and Universe in his famous work 
"On Learned Ignorance" (De docta ignoruntia). In his cosmological medi- 
tations, Cusanus has something that Ptolemy definitely did not have, name- 
ly the first outlines of a n  abstract mathematical background space in addi- 
tion to  and interpenetrating the concrete physical and cosmological space 
(see [17], and [47, pp. 5-27]). In Cusanus, and also in others, the universe it- 
self is sometimes called rnachinu rnundi (the world machine), an  expression 
which occurs already in the poem "De rerum natura" of the great Roman 
poet Lucretius (first century B.C.). Cusanus makes the following two state- 
ments: 
(A) The world is neither finite nor infinite, or, what is virtually the same, 
it is both finite and infinite. 
(B) The 17zachina rnundi has its center everywhere, and  thus nowhere, 
and its circumference is nowhere. 
Statement (A) will be discussed in the next section; statement (B) suggests 
to  me a homogeneous manifold whose center, due to the homogeneity, is 
everywhere and thus, in a sense, nowhere. And statements (A) and (B) taken 
together suggest the Bolyai-Lobachevsky geometry in the unit ball y: + y: 
+ yf < 1 of the E3.  In the non-Euclidean metric, this unit ball is homogene- 
ous relative to  a transitive group of motions, so that there can be n o  "abso- 
lute" center, and it has n o  circumference because it is open. It is infinite in 
its own metric, but finitein the metric of the ambient E3. 
These forward directed insights of Cusanus were adumbrations only, but 
unique ones; and until Kepler almost nothing like them occurred for over a 
century. It is true that before Kepler there was Giordano Bruno. But Bruno 
was unmathematical and his speculations have no nuance of mathematical 
persuasion, whereas Cusanus and Kepler were real mathematicians, while 
Copernicus was primarily an  astronomer. 
Copernicus decomposed the motion of  the earth into a yearly translation 
around the sun and a daily spinning around the axis; and in Kepler's subse- 
quent outlook the two motions are in effect represented by two vectorially 
independent paths in a n  underlying E3,  so  that, in suitable coordinates 
[x,y,z) the location of a point of the body of  the Earth at  time t is represen- 
table by the formulas 
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x(t) = rsin Bcos (p -I- nt) + [ ( t )  , 
(7) y(t) = r sin 8 sin (cp + nt) + 7 ( t )  , 
z ( t )  = rcos6  + .r(t) , 
where r is the distance of the point of the body of the earth from the center 
of the earth, ( 0 , ~ )  are its latitude and longitude, n is a constant depending 
on the normalization of time, and ($(t) ,  ~ ( t ) ,  {(t)] are the coordinates of the 
center point of the earth at time t .  
In Copernicus there is no such underlying mathematical paradigm for the 
compound motion of the earth. As I have described it in [ I6  and 171, the 
Copernican World Machine was, vaguely, an arrangement of cycles or epi- 
cycles in the shape of wheels, rods, and gears, in which the movements of 
the parts of the machine had to be centrally controlled and hierarchically or- 
dered. Nothing could be "loose" and "free-floating," and no two sub- 
movements could be "independent" and "commutative." Also, the celesti- 
al body itself was firmly affixed to a spot on the hierarchically last orbis, 
and it is this orbis which moved (as did other wheels), not the body itself. 
Even Copernicus never decided whether an orbis was a circular hoop or a 
spherical shell. Kepler very knowingly swept away the hoops and shells, and 
let the planet traverse a path in E3, as envisioned today. 
The outlook of Copernicus led him to a peculiar construction. Since, in 
his machine, the daily and yearly motions of the earth were hierarchically 
ordered, therefore, prirna facie, under whichever ordering, the axis of daily 
rotation "ought" to be firmly affixed to the plane of the ecliptic in which 
the yearly motion takes place. But it is not so affixed, since in E3 the axis of 
the earth remains parallel to itself. Copernicus accounted for this by intro- 
ducing a third motion, a Motion of Declination, in which "the axis of the 
Earth describes the surface of a cone in a year, moving in an opposite direc- 
tion to that of  the Earth's center, that is from east to west" [35, pp. 
140-1411. This Third Motion had no appeal. Even before Kepler it was re- 
jected by Christoph Rothmann and Giordano Bruno [58, p. 1991, although 
Copernicus was able to make magnificent use of it. He made the period of 
the Third Motion slightly less than a year, and explained the precession of 
the equinoxes thereby. 
Furthermore, unlike Kepler after him, Copernicus does not, because he 
cannot, show an awareness of the fact that, due to his heliocentric hypothe- 
sis, the orbit of each planet is in a (mathematical) plane of its own, and that 
these planes are various planes in a common three-dimensional (mathemati- 
cal) space. It seems that Copernicus expressly introduces only the plane of 
the ecliptic, and if he aIso speaks of the line of intersection of the planetary 
orbit with the plane of the ecliptic then he apparently refers only to the line 
joining the two nodes of the planetary orbit without envisaging a plane of 
the planetary orbit too. 
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Kepler's "post-Copernican" work began in earnest with his New Astron- 
only. In it he immediately takes it for granted and expressly posits that any 
planetary orbit-which he frequently calls an "excenter"-lies in a (mathe- 
matical) plane. If he had not taken the plane for granted, how could he have 
debated for so long what kind of "oval'' the orbit of Mars actually is? Or, 
even more pertinently, how could Kepler have arrived at his tremendous 
Law that the radius vector from the focal center of the orbit to the planet 
sweeps out equal areas in equal times, unless he took it for granted that the 
various areas are "flat" areas in one and the same plane. Copernicus did 
not even begin to conceive such a law because he was still far removed from 
the thought patterns of space and analysis that the inception of such a law 
presupposes. The great originality of the Law of Areas is best attested to by 
the fact that Isaac Newton made his version of it the very first theorem of 
the Principia, although for reasons best known to himself Newton did not 
choose to quote Kepler in the context. 
Kepler's planetary laws are not the only evidence for his awareness of the 
importance of space in science. Other evidence is a new spatial setting, a 
revolutionary one, in his optical Theory of Vision, which came into being 
virtually simultaneously with his New Astronomy and which he even called 
"the optical part of astronomy (astronomiae pars optica)." The change of 
spatial setting was as follows. Before Kepler-with one exception to which 
we will soon turn-the Iight rays between the eye and the object seen by the 
eye were thought to move in a cone which had its vertex in the pupil and the 
base on the object. Kepler, however, changed and reversed the setting. In 
the process of seeing there are many cones, narrow ones. Each point of the 
object seen is the vertex of a cone, and all cones thus arising have their bases 
on the eyeball. Thus Kepler views the object as an aggregate of points, ?i la 
Cantor, and it is obviously a pointset in a pre-existent mathematical space. 
Before Kepler, the cone had the same "space-less" nature and setting as in 
Apollonius. But Kepler's cones are "modern" cones, in a "modern" pre- 
existent space, The great originality of Kepler's innovation is emphasized in 
Vasco Ronchi [67 and 681, and a valuable account is also in Alistair Crom- 
bie [32]. 
The one exception to the pre-Kepler conception was the mathematician 
Francesco Maurolico (1494-1575) whose work showed that he already rec- 
ognized the reversal of cones [57]. But Ronchi feels certain that Maurolico's 
work was unknown to Kepler when he worked out his optics. As stated at 
the beginning of this section, in the second half of the sixteenth century 
there was among philosophers a sudden awakening of interest in the role of 
mathematics in science whose suddenness is hard to explain. Thus the pres- 
ent-day historian P.O. Kristeller says: 
The thinkers whom we shall discuss in the three remaining chapters were all active dur- 
ing the second half of the sixteenth century, and what separates them from those we 
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have considered so far is not merely the passing of a few decades, but the emeryence of a 
completely different intellectual atmosphere. 151, p. 911 
Apart from observing that the first half of the sixteenth century was the era 
of the great religious revolution that goes under the name of Reformation, 
Kristeller makes no real attempt to trace back this intellectual change-over 
to tangible roots. 
Kepler also demonstrated penetrating insights into the "analytical" role 
of space in purely mathematical contexts; I will adduce two instances. First, 
with skill and imagination, he computed the volumes of a large number of 
solid bodies, many of which were of his own devising, by viewing them as 
infinite series of infinitely thin laminas, or of infinitesimal wedge-shaped 
segments radiating from the axis, or of other types of vertical or oblique 
sections (see Boyer [21, p. 108, and also pp. 110-1 181 for similar exploits). 
Second, in the context of his optical work, Kepler introduced into the the- 
ory of conics a certain "space-related'' way of seeing things which may ap- 
pear commonplace today but was unprecedented in its time, just as many a 
present clichi was unexpectedly novel when Shakespeare uttered it first; and 
Shakespeare and Kepler were contemporaries. Kepler introduced foci of 
conics (which Apollonius did not have) and infinitely distant points in 
space, and he interconnected various conics in the foIlowing way: A circle, 
in which the foci coincide, can be stretched into an ellipse, and then into a 
parabola, in which one focus, the "blind" one, is at infinity; and this pro- 
cess can be reversed. Similarly, from a pair of intersecting lines, which is a 
"degenerate" hyperbola in which the foci and vertices all coincide, one 
passes through an infinity of hyperbolas to the parabola. 
Kepler summarized these findings by saying that the conics are related by 
"analogy." Seemingly independently, over two centuries later Jean-Victor 
Poncelet stated a "Law of Continuity7' in projective geometry which sub- 
sumes Kepler's finding, and Charles Taylor [72], a strong advocate of Kep- 
ler7s originality in the field, demands that the Law of Continuity be credited 
to him by priority. He maintains even more emphatically that Newton's 
"essay7' on conics, which is incorporated in the Principicr (see [GO, pp. 
76-log]), and in which Kepler is not mentioned, is a legacy of Kepler's. In 
this assertion Taylor may be right because the style and diction of the "es- 
say," especially the manner in which it speaks of points at infinity, are all 
entirely Keplerian. 
Taylor [72] also assigns to Kepler statements in Desargues that are fre- 
quently assumed to be original with Desargues. This, I think, has to be qual- 
ified. Desargues7s theorem on triangles in perspective (published in Abra- 
ham Bosse) has a "message" about space in geometry for which I find no 
precedent in Kepler. The theorem states that i f  two triangles in E' are in per- 
spective-that is, i f  the three lines joining corresponding vertices meet at a 
point, finite or infinite-then the three finite or infinite points at which cor- 
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responding sides of the triangle intersect lie in a straight line, finite or infi- 
nite. The theorem also holds for two triangles in a plane, but as Hilbert has 
shown [44], the plane must be imbeddable in a three-dimensional space in 
the following sense: There is a system of Euclid-like axioms for a 3-space 
for which the theorem holds throughout, but which is such that i f  one omits 
those axioms which refer to three-dimensionality then the theorem may fail 
(Non-Desarguean Geometry). I cannot imagine the Greeks or the medieval 
schoolmen conceiving a theorem in two dimensions whose proof requires 
that the 2-space be imbeddable in a 3-space in which a three-dimensional 
version of the theorem is demonstrable; and I do not think that Kepler had 
such anticipations either. 
The same book o f  Hilbert has another feature that quite directly high- 
lights the supremacy of analysis over geometry in mathematics today. Hil- 
bert introduces a system of axioms that iiriplicitly defines objects like 
points, lines, and planes, and in order to verify the consistency of the ax- 
ioms he explicitly defines the objects using various kinds of numbers whose 
existence and consiste~icy is taken as known. But these numbers are in the 
last instance grounded in analysis, whose consistency is thus taken for 
granted, so that altogether geometry is built on analysis. Archimedes would 
have been perplexed. By his entire mathematical upbringing, it is geometry 
that would have a claim for being assumed consistent, with analysis, what- 
ever that be, to be founded on it. 
We now turn to Descartes. His Geometry (La Gio/?7itrie, 1637) is etched 
on the E3 of today and is thus entirely "modern," its only flaws resulting 
from Descarres7s uncertainty about negative numbers. But in his physical 
science Descartes has a species of  space, called extensio or i tend~le, in which 
the structure of E' manifests itself so little that commentators are provoked 
into remarking that i t  is "still medieval." And yet the sharp separation of 
the two spaces in Descartes was in keeping with an irreversible development 
then in progress. Beginning with Kepler, with anticipations in Cusanus and 
Copernicus, every physicaI (or cosmological) system had two spaces in its 
fabric, whether the author of the system realized i t  or not: an "objective" 
space of the Physis of the system, and a "subjective" mathematical back- 
ground space; the latter space being "subjective" because all objects of 
mathematics-however much suggested by the external world-are never- 
theless internally conceived, internally created, and inwardly structured (see 
[7, p. 471). Usually these two spaces are interpenetrating and intergrown to 
some extent. But Descartes, not being a "mathematical" physicist at all, 
and leaning towards neat, crisp separations, kept the (would-be) mathemat- 
ical (background) space virtually out of direct physical settings, and dis- 
played it mainly as the E3 of his Geometry. 
We note in passing that the emergence of a "subjective" mathematical 
background space in contrast t o  the "objecrive" space of physical manifes- 
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tations is only a special aspect of the emergence of a n  attitude of "subjectiv- 
ity" in contrast to one of "objectivity" in a vast realm of intellectuality dur-  
ing the Renaissance which has become a leading permanent distinction be- 
tween "ancient" and "modern." Descartes's revolution in philosophy was 
a signal event in this context; and,  t o  my way of thinking, even the body- 
soul dualism in Descartes is an  instance of the permanent opposition be- 
tween objective and subjective, which has thus come into being. A key 
reference to this entire subject-matter is The Individual and the Cosmos in 
Renaissance P/7ilosophy, by Ernst Cassirer 1291, especially chapter IV, 
"The subject-object problem in the philosophy of the Renaissance." I 
found further enlightenment in the even more difficuIt book of Georg 
LukGcs, "The Theory of the Novel," but it would exceed the plan of the 
present article to unravel its pertinence to our context. 
Isaac Newton undoubtedly had our E3 in his thinking when he  started the 
very first theorem of the Principia with his version of the Law of Areas 
(wording it thus: "the areas which revolving bodies describe by radii drawn 
to  an  immovable center of force d o  lie in the same immovable planes, and  
are proportional to the time in which they are described"), and when in the 
converse to the Law, which is the next theorem, the center is even "moving 
forwards with a n  uniform rectilinear motion" [60, pp. 40-431. On the other 
hand, in book 111, p. 419, Newton states the hypothesis "that the center of 
the system of the world is immovable," which suggests a gravitational space 
of the kind that eventually the Theory of  General Relativity would expli- 
cate. Yet, as if fusing the two spaces into one, Newton solemnly introduces 
a single space, which he terms absolute, obviously endowing it even with 
physico-metaphysical features beyond the call of operational necessity. This 
space failed, although many physicists tried to make sense of it. But the fail- 
ure did not affect the course of physics. As Jammer put it: 
It is interesting to note how little the actual progress of the science of mechanics was af- 
fected by general considerations concerning the nature of absolute space. Among the 
great French writers on  mechanics, Lagrange, Laplace and Poisson, none of them was 
much interested in the problem of absolute space. They all accepted the idea as a work- 
ing hypothesis without worrying about 11s theorettcal justification. In reading the Intro- 
ductions to their works, one discovers that they felt that sclence could very well dlspense 
with general considerations about absolute space. [45, pp. 137-1381 
Also, in the eighteenth century, Diderot and D'Alembert, in the article 
"Espace" of their Encyclop6die, say with regard to  the existence of abso- 
lute space: "cette question obscure est inutile h la Ge'omitrie et h la 
Physique." 
But all such negative statements about Newton's absolute space must be 
tempered by the observation that Newton refers to this space only in the so- 
called "Scholia" of the Principia, and  not in the  operational body of the 
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Principia itself, and that the total omission of the SchoIia from the work 
would in no wise affect its operational integrity or its scientific standing. 
After Newton, in the eighteenth century there was no major overt devel- 
opment involving space as a key concept of analysis, In the nineteenth cen- 
tury, however, space made world-wide "headlines" through non-Euclidean 
and Riemannian geometry, and in the twentieth century through the Gene- 
ral Theory of Relativity. None of the other key concepts received this kind 
of publicity even in scientific circles, except that Georg Cantor's Theory of 
Aggregates affected each of them to an extent. 
The Encyclopedic Altnanac 1970 of The New York Titlies (on p. 458, un- 
der Landmarks of Science, which are listed chronologicaliy) assigns to the 
years 1825-1826 the "foundation of basic concepts of non-Euclidean geom- 
etry" by Lobachevsky and Bolyai, and (on p. 471, under Men of Science 
and Mathematics) it states that Bernhard Riemann "developed non-Eucli- 
dean system of geometry representing elliptic space," obviously referring to  
his renowned paper [65], which was composed and orally presented in 1856 
and published posthumously in 1867. A comparison of these two listings 
cannot but suggest to the reader, general or mathematical-or rather con- 
firm him in a belief already vaguely held-that the achievement of Bolyai- 
Lobachevsky was the landmark event-undoubtedly instantly hailed as  
such-and that the achievement of Riemann, however important, was only 
a kind of follow-up to it. 
But this is not how developments unfolded, in the realm of mathematics 
at any rate. The work of Bolyai and Lobachevsky lay half-dormant for 
many years. Mathematicians like Jacobi, HamiIton, Poncelet, Mobius, 
Pliicker, and others in the first half of the nineteenth century showed almost 
no awareness of it [18]. There is absolutely no allusion to  it in [65], or any- 
where else in Riemann. It was first incorporated into a textbook by R. 
BaItzer in 1867, the same year in which Riemann's memoir was published, 
and only then did things begin t o  happen very briskly. In 1868, E. Beltrami 
linked up the hyperbolic geometry of Bolyai-Lobachevsky with the elliptic 
geometry of Riemann, by assimilating the style of the hyperbolic geometry 
to Riemann's, In 1871, Felix Klein made the distinction, which was subtle 
for that period, between Riemann's elliptic line-element on the sphere, as 
Riemann himself had introduced it, and the same line element on projective 
space, which arises from the sphere by identifying pairs of antipodal points. 
And in 1877 the American astronomer Simon Newcomb, referring back to 
Riemann, in an article (written in English) in the then very prestigious Crelle 
Journal 1591, was obviously groping for this projective space in three di- 
mensions as a possible model for our universe, thus anticipating by forty 
years Albert Einstein's proposal that the universe might be a relativistic 
compact space of the type of the sphere. It is worth quoting the last para- 
graph of Newcomb's article: 
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I t  may be also remarked that there is nothlng within our  experience whrch will j u s t~ fy  a 
denial of  the possibilrty that the space In which we flnd ourselves may be curved in the 
manner here supposed. It might be  claimed that the d~s tance  of the farthest v is~ble  star 15 
but a small f r a c t ~ o n  of the greatest distance D, but no t l i~ng  more. The  sublectrve rnlpos- 
rrb~lity of conceiving of the r c l a t~on  of the most dlstarit polnts In sucti a spacc docs not 
render its ekistencc r n c ~ e d ~ b l e .  In fact our  d~ff icul ty  ir not urllihc that n h ~ c h  r ~ i ~ ~ s t  have 
bccn felt by the f ~ r i t  man t o  whom the idea of the sphcr~ci ty  of the earth wa5 suggested 
In concclvlng h o ~ ,  by travellrng in a constant drrect~on,  he could return to the polnt 
from ~ v l i ~ c h  he startcd \vitliout, durrng hrr journey, finding any scns~b lc  hange in the dr- 
rectlon of gravltp. 
But why did Riemann gain the attention of other mathematicians so  
much more readily than Bolyai and Lobachevsky? Because the latter, al- 
though playing a new game in geometry, were nevertheless playing it on the 
traditional turf of Euclid and Archimedes. They may have revolted against 
Euclid, but they were fighting the revolt with the traditional Greek weapon- 
ry. And in a certain sense they were not even the first t o  play on Euclid's 
own field a game different from his. T h e  geometry of perspectivity, of Kep- 
ler and Desargues, of Monge, Lazar Carnot,  and PonceIet had already been 
"new" in this sense. Furthermore, a kind of non-Euclidean geometry was 
involved in Lagrange's mechanics of finite systems of mass points with con- 
straints. As I have put it: The emergence of general coordinates and free pa- 
rameters in the eighteenth century was intellectually a prelude to  the rise of 
multi-dimensional geometries, Euclidean and non-Euclidean, in the nine- 
teenth century [7, p. 2011. 
But Riemann's turf was a radically new one. It was the most general 
Hausdorff space as a topological substratum, the like of which Bolyai and 
Lobachevsky did not have in their vision at all. And on this substratum Rie- 
mann built a new kind of geometric structure. H e  took the theorem of Py- 
thagoras, which is the pinnacle of attainment of book I of Euclid's Ele- 
ments, and turned it into a presumptive (infinitesimal) building stone of the 
structure. This turning of a conclusion into an  assumption set the pattern 
for many similar "inversions" in the twentieth century, but none was as 
profoundly original as Riemann's own. 
The aim and achievement of Bolyai and Lobachevsky, who were interest- 
ed in Euclid's axiom on parallels and hardly anything else, was the erection 
of axiomatics, and methodologically their work culminated in Hilbert's 
book [44], which, for  the working mathematician, is a textbook in applied 
axiomatics, as it were. But Riemann, during his relatively short span of  
mathematical activity (he did not start publishing very early and died before 
reaching forty), showed n o  interest in axiomatics, mathematical logic, o r  
anything else "foundational," nor in any kind of "abstract" algebra, but  
only in the promotion of analysis, in the very broad sense of the term in 
which it is used in the present paper. In this aim he succeeded as had nobody 
since Pythagoras, even Euler not excepted. 
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Half a century after its publication, Riemann's memoir led, via C.G. Ric- 
ci, to Einstein's General Theory of Relativity, as it came about (with Ein- 
stein aficionados maintaining that he would have found the theory anyway, 
Ricci or no Ricci); and we note that the theory is providing a vindication of 
the thesis that there is no physical "foreground" space without a mathemat- 
ical "background" space. Thus the treatise of Hawking and Ellis [40] firm- 
ly posits a four-dimensional Hausdorff manifold globally, with physical 
data imposed on it. And not only a final dissolution of the physical universe 
but also the initial creation of it are nothing but "singularities" in the physi- 
cal data, with the mathematical substratum itself being "intact." 
Albert Einstein himself would probably have hesitated to agree to a 
"dualistic" distinction between physical and mathematical space in a uni- 
verse as he envisaged i t .  He probably would have tried to argue that in any 
creation of the universe-be it big-bang or peaceful-the instantly evolving 
physical space ought to co-evolve a mathematical background space too, by 
a kind of "analytic continuation," as it were. But it would be very difficult 
to find a specific "model" for the would-be universe in which to rationalize 
such an "evolution." Even "mythological" cosmogonies knew chis. In Pla- 
to's dialogue Timaeus, Space (chora) is a pre-existent datum, a feature of 
Necessity (Ananke), whereas Time (cl'lronos), a "moving likeness of Eterni- 
ty,'' came into existence along with the Heaven (Ouranos) (see V1, p. 1021). 
H.P. Robertson (1903-1961), a talented cosmologist, tried to popularize a 
slogan of his, that "Geometry is a part of Physics." The slogan is all right, 
as long as one realizes that the physics to which geometry is to be subordi- 
nated presupposes a mathematical background space on which to be 
erected. 
A clear-cut, though not intended corroboration of our thesis can be 
found in Alfvin [2, p. 683, and I have already adduced i t  in [17, p. 1371. In 
Worlds - Anfiworlds, Alfvin is concerned with the creation of a megagal- 
axy out of previously given ambiplasma, and, guided by a hydrodynamical 
paradigm that had been set up by James Jeans decades before, he makes the 
following assumption: "The starting point in our model is an ambiplasma, 
which fills the huge sphere. Its density is uniform throughout." This huge 
primordial blob of ambiplasma is obviously inert, but something somehow 
sets it in motion, and a universe emerges with a cosmological space-setting 
peculiar to itself. But before such an "individual" cosmological space can 
be called into being there must at first be, in a mathematical "somewhere," 
a "neutral" space in which the "sphere"-like blob of ambiplasma is locat- 
ed. This neutral space is apparently a Euclidean background space, because 
in such a space it is easy to verify mathematically the demand that the ambi- 
plasma shall have a density, and uniformly the same; or it would have to be 
another kind of "neutral" space in which spheres and point densities can be 
readily depicted. 
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This section began with the introduction of linear perspective in painting 
and will be terminated with one or two observations on the abandonment of 
perspective in painting about a century or so ago. I have already commented 
on this situation very briefly in [7, p .  250 and 13, p. 3021, and having since 
then found my outlook corroborated by R.L. Delevoy [34 (see also [37, 
chapter XI), I now venture to be a little more explicit. The grand name in 
the abandonment of perspective-the Riemann of the movement, as it 
were-is Paul Cizanne. He did not "destroy7' linear perspective, as is some- 
times asserted, but replaced i t  by a richer and more variegated one, just as 
Riemann in creating a general manifold did not "destroy7' Euclidean space 
but replaced it by a rich variety of "space forms," as Felix Klein termed 
them. As I have gathered from reading Loran [53]-whether this was pre- 
cisely Loran's judgment or not-what Cizanne did, perhaps more by in- 
spired drive than by calculated design, was, in effect, to retain the principle 
of perspectivity, but to replace the strict linear perspective with only one 
vanishing point by a much more richly structured perspective in which there 
are several "regional" vanishing points towards which lines of vision can 
and do  severally converge. Analogously, by Riemann's express prescrip- 
tion, a manifold is a union of several overlapping neighborhoods, each Eu- 
clidean. Just as even before Riemann there were non-Euclidean, or Iess- 
than-Euclidean structures on a Euclidean substratum, so also before 
Ce'zanne there were painters who, without violating linear perspective, were 
straining to become dissociated from i t .  A prominent such predecessor of 
Ce'zanne, who is singled out as such somewhere in Delevoy [ 3 4 ] ,  was 
Dominique Ingres. 
After Cizanne, an actual break with perspective began t o  manifest itself 
in Cubism, and in Picasso's Guernica not only is there no perspective left, 
but there is only the flattest lamina of space left at all; this development is in 
accord with the statement made towards the end of section 11, that in the 
twentieth century, space, like other key concepts of analysis, has been "sec- 
ularized" and "flattened-out" in various ways. Finally, however superficial 
the observation may be, the pointiIlism of Seurat and others, which ap- 
peared between Cizanne and Picasso, reminds me of the lesson taught by 
Georg Cantor (a contemporary of Seurat), that any space, however tightly 
organized, is an aggregate of points first of all. 
In art, as opposed to mathematics, there is still a presumption that linear 
perspective, however painters may have rebelled against it, is the one and 
only way for the human eye actually to  "see" things in space. The late art 
historian Erwin Panofsky, in a very erudite early essay, raised doubts 
whether the optical situation is really so, unchangeably; and even some of 
his most admiring students and friends have never since forgiven him this 
"heresy." A precedent from mathematics ought to  warn against being too 
dogmatic in such contexts. G. Helmholtz, also a great student of human vi- 
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sion, once aimed at proving that man's ambient space must be Euclidean if 
it is sufficiently homogeneous to human vision. Whereupon Friedrich Schur 
[69] pointed out (see also 1361) that in any space of constant curvature, pos- 
itive, zero, or negative, at any point, and perpendicular to any direction, 
there is a totally geodesic hyperplane En-'; and conversely, that any two 
such hyperplanes can be transformed into each other by a motion. Since for 
negative curvature, geodesics emanating from the same point never meet 
again, i t  is certainly impossible by vision to separate Euclidean space from a 
hyperbolic one. 
VI .  INFINITY 
In Greek natural philosophy the meaning of infinity was a major problem 
from first to last, from the earliest pre-Socratics in the sixth century B.C. to 
the last "Commentators" in the fifth century A.D. Anaximander of Miletus, 
a younger contemporary of Thales, had an intelfectual brush with infinity, 
not much more, and this was enough to immortalize him in the annals of 
philosophy, any philosophy of the West. 
But Greek professional mathematics, although vaguely familiar with the 
concept of infinity, shied from any direct face-to-face encounter with it, 
even in contexts which, from our retrospect, would cry out for at least a 
mention of it, if not for an outright involvement with it. For instance, Eu- 
clid has the theorem (9,20) that ')rime numbers are more than any as- 
signed multitude of prime numbers." Wording and proof of the theorem 
are flawless; the proof is ingenious and the same as today's. But what is 
missing, in retrospect at least, is the paraphrase of this assertion: that the 
number of prime numbers is infinite. No such straight paraphrase appears 
to be found anywhere in extant Greek writings, although the content of the 
paraphrase must have been in the forefront of the mind of Eratosthenes 
when he constructed his famous "sieve." Thus Greek mathematics shied 
away from the infinitely large; and in the case of the "infinitely small," the 
mighty Archimedes apparently never "saw" that the position of the tangent 
to a curve at a given point is the "limit" of positions of chords through the 
given point and a movable second point, as the movable point converges to 
the given one. Yet Archimedes was not at all far from such an insight; while 
Euclid defines a tangent as a supporting line to the curve in its entire extent, 
Archimedes in his book On Spirals demands the property only locally, as a 
matter of course. 
But this limitation changed visibly with the earliest advent of the Renais- 
sance; infinity in mathematics and in mathematically oriented science began 
to manifest itself directly and openly, and in various aspects. 
The clearest and most unmistakably "modern7' manifestation of infinity 
occurred when John Wallis in 1656 introduced the perduring symbol "m" 
for an infinitely large number and started operating with it, faultily and per- 
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haps even recklessly, but determinedly, as with any other symbol or  num- 
ber. This was far from a front-ranking achievement of the century. But it 
was modernism vibrating. Archimedes knew-in his own thought patteLns 
as clearly and sharply as we in ours-that 1 + tends to 1 as n tends to 
infinity; but he did not have the elation of being able to  express this by 
and he could articulate the statement and its proof only by a mass of words 
which would weary even his most ardent admirer of today. 
Not all the limitations of Greek mathematics in comprehending the infi- 
nitely small were limitations of Greek intellectuality in its entirety. Thus,  
Aristotle made a strenuous effort in the second half of his Physics to shed 
light on the nature of  the linear continuum of real numbers, especiaIly by 
examining the precise meaning of concepts like together (hhnu),  apart  
(ch61-is), in contact (huptdt?lenon), between (t??etux$), in succession 
(ephexgs), contiguous (echdrnenon), continuous (synechis); but Greek pro- 
fessional mathematics became in no wise involved in the effort, a s  if it were 
totally unaware of it. Mathematics could not or would not recognize that 
the problem involved, although "masquerading" as physics or natural phil- 
osophy, was in fact a profoundly mathematical one. There is no  evidence 
that the Middle Ages recognized this either; for instance, there certainly is 
nothing in this direction in the extensive commentary on the Physics by 
Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274). The first to recognize the mathematical na- 
ture of the problem was Gregory St. Vincent. In  a large mathematical work 
which appeared in 1647 (but was apparently done twenty years before), he 
put Zeno's puzzle, Achilles and the Tortoise, into a mathematical setting, 
and thus resolved the puzzle mathematically (see [55, pp. 79-80]). 
The puzzle maintains, against all evidence, that in a race between the 
quick-footed Achilles and the slow-moving tortoise, if the tortoise has any 
head start a t  all, then Achilles cannot overtake him, ever. By the time Achil- 
les has reached the starting point of the tortoise, the latter has rnoved on by 
a certain distance. When Achilles covers that distance, the tortoise has 
gained a further distance, etc. Thus the tortoise always remains ahead. Aris- 
totle maintains that the puzzle is wrong. H e  knows that the refutation of the 
puzzle turns on using the structural properties of the linear continuum and  
of uniform motion, and he talks endlessly about it aI1. But it is almost im- 
possible t o  say whether and how the  actual refutation of the puzzle by 
Aristotle comes about. Gregory St. Vincent, however, sets up the obvious 
geometric series involved in bringing Achilles and the Tortoise abreast of 
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each other and verifies that the series has a finite sum, which he calls the 
limit of the series (see [46, p. 4371). Having done this he takes it for granted 
that the puzzle is refuted thereby. His contemporary readers applauded his 
solution, totally unconcerned about the "foundational7' question of wheth- 
er there really is a point on the Iine of pursuit which the sum of the geomet- 
ric series represents. The seventeenth and even eighteenth centuries were not 
worried, not yet, by such questions of rigor. It is worth observing that only 
in 1760 did Father Gerdil "simplify" Gregory's argument by noticing that if 
the starting distance is one league and Achilles runs ten times faster than the 
Tortoise, and x is the distance covered by the Tortoise before they meet, 
then x is a solution of the equation lox  = 1 + x. 
The slowness with which leading analytic conceptions crystallized even in 
the fast-moving seventeenth century can be gauged by the following com- 
parison. Gregory, in his Opusgeometricui~z of 1647, says that the 
tcrmknus ot a progression is the end of the scr~cs to which the progreqslon doe\ not at- 
tain, even if continued to infin~ty, but to whlch ~t can approach Inore closely than by 
any given interval [46, p. 4371, 
which is a rather clear definition of the sum of an infinite series. But the 
concepts of the limit of a function at a point, and of the derivative of a 
function at a point, are deeply embedded in the fabric of Newton's Princip- 
ia of 1686 and are defined there by the following statements, which are 
hardly an advance on Gregory's formulation of forty years before. 
Quant~ties, and the ratios of quantltles, wh~ch in any f ~ n ~ t e  time converge continually to 
equal~ty, and before the end of that tlme approach ncarer to each other than by any giv- 
en difference, become ult~mately equal. 
For those ul t~mate ratlo, wtth wh~ch quantlties van~sh are not truly the ratlos of u111- 
mate quantltles, but I~rnits towards whlch the rat105 of quantit~es, decreasing w~thout  a 
lirn~t, do alsays converge; and to wh~ch they approach nearer than by any glven d~ffc r -  
encc, but nevergo beyond, nor In effect attar1 to,  ~ ~ n t ~ l  the quantit~cs have d ~ r n ~ n ~ s h e d  111 
rtlfrnrt~rm. 160, pp. 29and 391 
Returning from the infinitely small to the infinitely large, with which this 
section actually began, we note that there is one area of the infinitely large 
to which the age of the Scientific Revolution did not contribute anything 
constructive. Galileo observed something that had been sporadically no- 
ticed since antiquity: that an infinite set can be in one-to-one correspon- 
dence with a proper part of itself-or, rather, he adhered to a vaguely 
shared consensus that because of such a possibility infinite sets do not "in 
actuality" exist. Galilee's observation was that two Iine segments of un- 
equal length can be put into a point-by-point correspondence by a perspec- 
tivity; and, what is a little subtler, that the set of integers i n ] ,  n > 1,  can be 
put into a one-to-one correspondence with its subset ( n z ]  (see [46, p. 9931). 
It is remarkable that until the middle of the nineteenth century such obser- 
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vations were discouraging rather than provocative. A possible explanation 
for this is that transfinite numbers somehow belong to, or a t  least are con- 
tiguous to "foundations" of mathematics and that the mathematicians of 
the seventeenth and  eighteenth centuries were fully occupied with first 
amassing "substantive" subject matter, for  which to  lay "foundations" 
afterwards. 
Also, there were the misgivings of philosophers to overcome. Aristotle's 
Physics has a series of arguments against the existence of the infinitely 
large, one of them being that if there were an infinitely large body (soma), 
then any finite body when added to it would be "annihilated" by it. Georg 
Cantor himself interpreted this argument to be a reasoned opposition 
against the relation n + a = a + n = a,  which holds if a is any infinite car- 
dinal number and n is a finite one. And he adds that even for an infinite or- 
dinal number a, one has n + cw = or, but that cw + n > or. Cantor apparent- 
ly considers that t o  be a sufficient refutation of Aristotle because he adds, 
as if in support of the refutation, that if a finite ordinal number has the te- 
merity to range itself in front of a n  infinite one, then it is being absorbed by 
the latter, but if it has the modesty of placing itself in the rear of the infinite 
one, it is saved (see [26, p. 1761, also [ I I ,  p. 612]), Even gods nod a t  times. 
Aristotle's argument as stated above has some application even today. 
The "classicaI" principle from thermodynamics that the total energy of a 
closed physical system is constant becomes meaningless if the total energy is 
infinite, and a physicist who strongly believes in the principle might there- 
fore hesitate t o  advocate a cosmological theory of the universe in which the 
total energy need not be finite. Aristotle already argues, in thought patterns 
of his, that an  infinite universe would mean an infinite total mass and an in- 
finite rotational momentum (his universe performed a diurnal rotation), 
both of which he considered too absurd to contemplate (De caelo, book I, 
chapters 5 and 6). The statement that the total energy of the universe, o r  of 
any closed physical system, is finite, o r  that it is infinite, is a mathematical 
statement of the kind that can be articulated only if the system is presented 
by a mathematical paradigm in a mathematical setting; because energy, as 
usually conceived, is a non-negative real-valued additive set function, so 
that a ring of sets, preferably of Bore1 subsets of a manifold M, must be 
given before any statement can be made. And the total energy is finite o r  in- 
finite depending on whether the least upper bound of the set function is 
finite o r  infinite. Thus, barring an unusual structure of the ring of sets on 
which the energy is defined and finitely-valued, the total energy will also be 
finite if the manifoId M is compact; unless the mass-distribution has singu- 
larities S, in which case, however, M - Swill usually cease to  be compact. 
It was this kind of intricacy that caused Willem de Sitter, the eminent ear- 
ly student of general relativity, to  declare that "Infinity is not a physical, 
but a mathematical concept. "This is a very important "key phrase" 117, p.  
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1521 about the role of infinitude in physics and cosmology especially with 
regard to the problem of the size of the universe, to which we will turn next. 
But before taking up the problem, we ought to quote the context from 
which the key phrase is taken, because we are not adopting the particulars 
of de Sitter's rationale: 
Wow t h e g , ~  outslde our neighborhood are, we d o  not know, and how they are at infin- 
ity, of elther space and time, we shall never know, otherwise it would not be infinity. 
That is what Archimedes meant when he s a d  that the universe could not be inftntte. The 
unlverse that we know cannot be infinite, became we ourselves are f ~ n ~ t e .  Infinity 1s not 
a physical, but a mathematical concept, introduced to make our equations more sym- 
metrical and elegant. [70, p. 1131 
I have dealt with the problem of the size of the universe extensively in [8, 
9, chapter 14, 11, and 171, and I will restrict myself now to the basic interac- 
tions between this problem and the emergence of analysis in the Renaissance 
and after. The fact of the matter is that the only persons loudly and flatly to 
proclaim the infinitude of the universe were non-scientists like Giordano 
Bruno (1548-1600) and, long before him, Hasdai Crescas (1340-141 1) (see 
145, p. 79]), and that scientists proper were very circumspect in asserting 
the infinity of the universe even if they came close to it. 
Thus, as we have already observed in section V, Cusanus held that the 
universe is both finite and infinite. Copernicus, a century later, was even 
more restrained. In "On the Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres" [30, 
book I, chapter 61, he states that the heaven (Caelum) is "immense," with- 
out ever amplifying what "immense" means. Further on, in chapter 8 of 
book I, he touches upon the question whether the world (mundus) is finite 
or infinite, but evades making a decision by declaring that this is the kind of 
question which should be left to physiologoi (obviously: philosophers of 
nature) to  argue about. Johannes Kepler, in a stirring polemic against 
Bruno, maintains with astrophysical arguments that the universe is finite 
149, pp. 58-87]. Alexander Koyri, a "secret" admirer of Kepler, presents 
Kepler's case with admirable objectivity and sympathy, and makes him out 
to be a better philosopher than Bruno. But not being able to  control his own 
hankering after "infinitization," Koyr6 terminates the eulogy of Kepler 
with the following "rebuke": 
All that is not new, nor speciflc to Kepler; it is the traditional teaching of Aristotelian 
scholasticism. Thus we have to admit that Johannes Kepler, the great and truly revolu- 
tionary thinker, was, nevertheless, bound by tradition. In his conception of being, of 
motion, though not of science, Kepfer, in the last Analysl~rernains an Aristotelian. [49, 
P. 871 
Galileo could not make up his mind whether the universe is finite or infinite 
149, pp. 95-99]. Descartes, however, with his customary incisiveness, came 
to a wonderful compromise decision. He called God infinite and only Him, 
and everything else was either finite or indefinite: thus his "extension," 
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which was his space of physics and cosmology, and which he identified with 
matter, was to him indefinite, but not infinite; and he would not budge 
from this position even under threat of intellectual "excommunication" by 
the British Platonist Henry More, a partisan o f  Descartes turned adverqry 
[49, pp. 101-1241. More maintained in correspondence with Descartes that 
the world, being God's creation, is as  infinite as God himself, and that to 
declare i t  to be only indefinitely large is an unpardonable blasphemy. But 
Descartes would not yield; and sudden death relieved him of further acri- 
mony. 
Finally we come to Isaac Newton, who is supposed to have brought the 
infinitization of the universe to its completion, primarily in the Principiu, I 
presume. But I do not find it there. In book 111 of the Pt'incipicr, entitled 
"The system of the world," the main characterization of the size of the uni- 
verse, which occurs a number of times, is the same as in Copernicus, as if it 
were taken from there, namely that it is "immense." Now, in the General 
Scholium of the book, on p. 544, the term "infinite" does occur, but un- 
mistakably as an attribute of Cod, in the sentence: "the Supreme God is a 
Being eternal, infinite, absolutely perfect." Similarly, when infinity occurs 
in the Scholium of book I ,  i t  is in a ten7pot~ul sense (see [49, p. 1661); and, 
when it occurs in the "essay" on conics which is incorporated in the Prin- 
cipiu (see [60, pp. 76-1081)- which we have described in the preceding sec- 
tion-then it refers only to infinite points of mathematical space, and not at 
all to points in physical or cosmological space. I do not mean to say, and it 
would be incorrect to assert, that these are the only occurrences of infini- 
tude in the works and correspondence of Newton. In correspondence with 
Richard Bentley, Newton makes some kind of admission, reluctantly, that 
the gravitational universe may be infinite [49, pp. 178-1791. But I do wish to 
emphasize that in the Principiu themselves, which went through three edi- 
tions in forty years, the matter of the infinity of the universe is handled ex- 
tremely gingerly. 
Having adduced all this evidence against the presumption that the seven- 
teenth century made the universe infinite, we still have to explain how, in 
spite of all such evidence, the impression does prevail that an irreversible in- 
finitization of some very tangible kind did take place. From our outlook the 
explanation is very simple. Something did happen, something very momen- 
tous indeed. It was the creation and emergence of Euclidean space, E3 and 
E" as an object in its own mathematical right, and as an indispensable 
background space for many other contexts; first, as background space for 
geometry itself, which had never had a ready-made background space be- 
fore, and then, conjointly with this, as background space for any kind of  
"perspective" in the arts, for astronomy and cosmology, for mechanics, 
terrestrial and celestial, and for physics, inorganic and also organic (as in 
Kepler's theory of vision). And this Euclidean space, which thr~s intruded it- 
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self as background space into everything, is of course infinite, by whatever 
mathematical criteria of infinitude there are. The theory of relativity added 
other space forms as candidates for background space, some of which are 
compact and thus "finite." But the ordinary Euclidean background space 
was in no wise displaced thereby. Classical mechanics, and most parts of 
classical physics in their classical Euclidean setting, continue to be the basis 
of college and university education for purposes of science and technology. 
Now, an infinite mathematical background space is of course not the 
same as an infinite universe. But, beginning with Giordano Bruno, philoso- 
phers and philosophizing scientists have been tending to equate the two, 
sometimes even to the detriment of their philosophical systems. We will 
conclude this section by adducing three instances of such "detrimental," or 
at least "unnecessary," identification. 
As pointed out above, Newton in book I11 of the Principia appraised the 
size of the universe as "immense" and not as "'infinite." In a letter to  
Richard Bentley, when pressed hard to come out for infinitude of the total 
gravitational mass of the universe, Newton mused that this could come 
about only by a suitable gravitational clustering of the masses, which, how- 
ever, he could "not think explicable by mere natural causes," but would be 
forced to ascribe "to the counsel and contrivance of a voluntary Agent" 
[49, p. 1851. Yet his absolute space is a metaphysical (and theological) fea- 
ture of his universe, and in its true role it is the Euclidean background space 
which is indispensable to  his analysis, although it is burdened with extra- 
mathematical attributes as unnecessary as they are obscure. 
Next, in his Critique of Pure Reason, Immanuel Kant introduced apriori 
intuitions of space and time which are fascinating by their originality, 
whether they be accepted or not. But, quite unnecessarily, he identified this 
space of intuitive perceprion with the mathematical background space of 
Euclid's geometry, thus causing embarrassment to his followers after non- 
Euclidean geometry came to the fore. As we have seen at the end of the pre- 
ceding section, spaces of any constant curvature are indeed not separable 
from Euclidean space in many respects. 
Finally, let us adduce an instance from philosophy in the twentieth cen- 
tury. The Tractatus logico-pl?ilosopkicus of the linguo-philosopher Ludwig 
Wittgenstein-which originally appeared in German in 1918-introduces a 
"logical space" (logischer Rauin) and a "world" or "universe" (Welt). The 
logical space is a kind of background space to the world, but it is hardly rec- 
ognizable as such, being a kind of aggregate or congeries of logical entities 
like "facts," "atomic facts," "states of affairs," "propositions," etc. 
Also, in a certain sense the logical space seems to be more substantive than 
the world, inasmuch as the constituents of the world are only some kind of 
"pictorial" representation of the constituents of the logical space. Yet, 
quite unnecessarily, Wittgenstein asserts that the logical space is "infinite"; 
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this is simply a standard philosophers' assertion since Giordano Bruno, and 
nothing else (for further details see [13, pp, 304-3051). 
V l l .  CONTINUITY 
As elaborated in previous contexts ([lo] and the second half of [15]), con- 
tinuity was highly non-mathematical by origin, extending, frequently under 
one synonym or  another, into vast areas of cognition, knowledge, and be- 
lief. It had an early affiliation with time and eternity, sharing their mystique 
and perennial appeal. Its non-mathematical roots were older, deeper, and 
stronger than those of any other key concept of analysis, and although the 
mathematization was partially begun already in antiquity, it proceeded 
rather slowly even through the length of the Scientific Revolution. Only in 
the course of the nineteenth century was continuity finally fitted to the exi- 
gencies of working mathematics, and after this process had come to an end, 
the consequences became immeasurable; most of topology since the late 
nineteenth century has been one of the consequences, in a sense. 
The Greek word for "continuous" is synech6s. It is an  all-purpose word, 
which can be used on any level of abstraction, and its basic meaning is "to 
keep, or- hold together" (which is also, as it happens, the basic meaning of 
the root of the Latin form "con-tinuous"). It occurs already in Homer, 
once in the Iliad, and once in the Odyssey. Ulysses relates that after one of 
his adventures was all over, he and his companions slept three days and 
three nights "continuously" (synechgs). It is remarkable that according to 
the Oxford English Dictionary the first verbal form pertaining to "continu- 
ous" in the English language was also associated with time. It is the word 
cor~tinual (in time), and it occurs, already before Chaucer, in the phrase 
"great exercise of body and continual travail of the spirit," in one of the so- 
called English Prose Treatises of the hermit Richard Rolle of Hampole 
(1290-1349). The word "continuous" itself gained currency only in the sev- 
enteenth century, and the antonyms to it have been not only "discontinu- 
ous," "discrete," and suchlike, but also "atomic," "particulate," and 
"monadic." 
A philosophico-mathematical conception of continuity pervades the 
work of G.W. Leibniz (1 646-1 71 6), who was a mathematician, philosopher, 
and logician all in one. He affirmed the presence, in many contexts, of 
some-thing he called Law of Continuity (Loi d e  Continuire?; /ex coi7tinui). It 
runs through his entire metaphysics and  science, and  also seems to involve 
mathematical continuous functions, but  in rather broad settings and appli- 
cations. It is not easy to give a fully satisfactory presentation of this Law of 
Continuity because Leibniz himself did not present it in a systematic study 
of its own, but reverted to it in various contexts, presenting each time some 
of its aspects pertinent to  the context. But if I extract from his various pro- 
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nouncements what might be applicable and relevant to mathematics, I am 
led to crediting him with the following two insights: 
A. First, Leibniz somehow conceived, broadly and systematically, the 
continuity of a ftinction y = f (x) in a rather general setting. This was origi- 
nal with him. Whatever continuity had been anticipated by the Greeks re- 
ferred only to the element of continuity that is involved in the structure of 
the linear conrinuutn (of real numbers). And while Aristotle tried to ap- 
proach the problem of the linear continuum front-face (see the preceding 
section), Greek professional mathematics dealt with it only i~ldirectly by 
creating the Eudoxian theory of proportions (Euclid, book 5 ) ,  and conjoint- 
ly with it the Archimedean process of exhaustion for the computation of 
areas, volumes, and similar objects. 
B. Second, Leibniz made a statement or statements that call be inter- 
preted to imply that the solutions of  functional equations governing physics 
and cosmology depend on  initial data in a continuous manner. This means 
that the equations are "stable," in the sense that "when the essential de- 
terminations of one being approximate those of another, as a consequence, 
all the properties o f  the former should also gradually approximate those of 
the latter" [lo,  p. 4981. This of course is part of the vision and outlook of 
the Age of Enlightenment: that we live in a n  orderly, sensible, rational 
world governed by reason, perhaps even the best possible world attainable. 
The nineteenth century cast mathematical doubts on this expectation, and 
the twentieth century proved it deathly wrong; but of this there is more later 
on.  
The above features of continuity in Leibniz, although not mathematically 
operational irnmediateIy, became so  eventually. There is nothing similar in 
Newton's Principiu except for aspects of continuity in the description of 
limits and derivatives cited in the preceding chapter. There is also a meta- 
physical circumlocution of continuity in Newton's description of his abso- 
lute time which runs as follows: 
Absolute, true, a n d  mathematical tlrne, of ~ t se l f ,  atid t rom it5 own  nature, flow5 
equably [ L a t ~ n :  ciequab~lrter] w ~ t h o u t  relation t o  any t l i~ng  eternal, and  by another narnc 
I S  called d u r a t ~ o n .  [60, p. 61 
This "equably" is a kind of circumlocution for "uniformly" or  "continu- 
ously," s o  that we again have a link between time and continuity, as we 
have had since Homer. 
Surprisingly, Imrnanuel Kant, after linking his u priori space to Euclid's 
geometry, links his apriori time to (the obviously Greek) enumerative num- 
bers, which constitute a discrete set, as if he had never outgrown an attach- 
ment to antiquarian Greek mathematical conceptions of his early schooling. 
There have been, though, occasional attempts, sometimes implied ones, t o  
"quantize" time by introducing minimal time lapses in atomic theories of 
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various ages: in Epicurean philosophy, in medieval Islamic philosophy 110, 
p. 494]), and even in twentieth-century quantum physics; but they were not 
serious enough to engage our  (or anybody's) attention. 
Going back from the era of Newton to the earliest days of the seventeenth 
century, we recall from section V that KepIer's procedure of merging vari- 
ous types of conics into one comprehensive family by adding to  E-oints a t  
infinity was broadened by Poncelet, in the first half of the nineteenth cen- 
tury, into something which he also called Law of Confintiity, a law which by 
intent was quite different from that of Leibniz. 
Going even further back, into the last decades of the sixteenth century, I 
must emphasize that F r a n ~ o i s  Vikte and  Simon Stevin, especially the latter, 
were vigorously recommending and propagating the use of decimal frac- 
tions for daily and theoretical purposes [22, pp. 347 ff]. In the twentieth 
century nothing brings the "continuity property" of the linear system of  
real numbers more intuitively to light and life rhan their representation by 
(infinite) decimal expansions. But this was not the immediate effect, and 
only in the second half of the nineteenth century were the real numbers syl- 
logistically secured. That  this development was almost unbelievably pro- 
tracted can be seen from the following: in the very first theorem of his Ele- 
tnents, Euclid took it for granted that  a circular arc  joining a point inside 
the circle with a point outside the circle meets its circumference somewhere. 
Virtually the same syllogistic gap was still present in C.F. Gauss, when, in 
the proofs of the theorem that a polynomial with complex coefficients has a 
complex root, he took it for granted that a polynomial of odd degree with 
real coefficients has a real root. But soon afterwards, in 1817, Bolzano pub- 
lished an  essay under the self-explanatory title: Purely analytical proof of 
the proposition that between any two values wl?icI? yield an opposite restilt, 
there lies at least one root of the equation. In a sense, Archimedes had al- 
ready laid bare the syllogistic gap [41, chapter V] when, making a virtue of 
necessity, he advertised a "principle" which he  called neusis, and which, 
somewhat anachronistically, can be stated as the following broad proposi- 
tion: if in a plane there are given two curves and the half-lines emanating 
from a fixed point, and if two of the half-lines intercept intervals of  differ- 
ent length between the two curves, then any interval of intermediate length 
can be intercepted by a half-line of intermediate position. 
Bernhard Riemann was a great elucidator of the role of continuity, and of 
continuity versus discontinuity, in the structure of functions, especially 
functions that actually occur in analysis. And these elucidations were near 
the center of his achievements. Most intriguing of all is his conception of a 
removable singularity, which he formed for holomorphic functions in one  
complex variable; actually Riemann speaks not of a "singularity" but of  a 
"discontinuity" (unstefigkeit), and he  does not call it "removable" but 
"liftable" (Izebbur), both of which when taken together suggest something 
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rather gentle. And, while most significant in the case of holomorphic func- 
tions of one complex variable, a "removable singularity" can of course also 
occur in other contexts. In the same memoir, which is Riemann's doctoral 
dissertation, he also constructs his Riemann surfaces for holomorphic func- 
tions, and the heart of the construction is the introduction of certain points 
of ramification, and then of local parameters to fit the neighborhoods of 
such points. A holomorphic function on the Riemann surface, when pro- 
jected down to the base space, may become many-valued in the neighbor- 
hood of a point of ramification and thus cease to be "regular" there, so 
that, in a sense, the Riemann surface also "removes" certain isolated singu- 
larities of the function. 
Next, Riemann's grand memoir on trigonometric series has as a "pream- 
ble" his theory of the Riemann integral on an  interval. This theory was 
something radically new. Before it, "everybody," that is, Cauchy, 
Dirichlet, and others started with defining the definite integral for a func- 
tion which is continuous to begin with, but which afterwards is permitted to 
have certain isolated discontinuities or  singularities. Riemann, however, 
starts out only with the demand that the function be bounded, then sets up a 
precise condition for the function to have an integral, and envisages the 
class of functions that are integrable in this sense. There was nothing like it 
before; that is, nobody before him introduced, with syllogistic precision, a 
class of functions to suit a pre-conceived purpose. In the creation of the in- 
tegral there is no mention of continuity at all. Only after the class of func- 
tions has been secured does Riemann show by an example that an integrable 
function may have discontinuities everywhere dense. Riemann was not yet 
"ready" to formulate Lebesgue's criterion that a bounded function is Rie- 
mann integrable if and only if the set of its discontinuities has outer measure 
zero; but in style and spirit he was not far from it. 
Finally, in his seminal work on shock waves [66, pp. 156-1781, Riemann 
pioneered in exhibiting for certain partial differential equations solutions 
with rather violent discontinuities, and he coined the strong term compres- 
sion thrust (Verdichtungsstoss) in the context. All Riemann's work was ex- 
ceptionally future-oriented, but this essay was perhaps more so than any 
other. The paper appeared in 1860. In 1877 E.B. Christoffel added some 
elaborations, and in 1887 a French mathematician, P.H. Hugoniot, redis- 
covered the results, apparently independently, so that sometimes a Rie- 
mann-Hugoniot theory is referred to. In 1903 the distinguished analyst 
Jacques Hadamard, in a book on propagation of waves, incorporated a de- 
tailed account of such discontinuous solutions, which represent shock 
waves. Whatever the original appeal of Hadamard's book may have been, 
during World War I1 it was suddenly closely studied by some members of  
the Manhattan Project for the construction of an atomic bomb. 
Whether Riemann, in the nineteenth century, realized it or not, his mem- 
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oir on the possibility of shock waves was a rebuttal of Leibniz's presump- 
tion that the mathematical functional equations which govern the universe 
depend continuously on  initial values each time, and thus also on intermedi- 
ate values, and therefore remain "stable7' indefinitely, as the Age of En- 
lightenment was intellectually conditioned to envisage the situation. And it 
was left to the twentieth century to  turn the speculative possibility into a 
physical reality. Riemann gives the impression of having been a gentle per- 
son himself. But by Zeitgeist he was a contemporary of Karl Marx and other 
propagators of violence, and being one of the most far-sighted mathemati- 
cians ever, he could not but foresee that "discontinuities," even violent 
ones, would be the need, demand, and fate of the future, for good or ill (see 
[141). 
The mathematical conception of continuity as syllogistically formulated 
in the course of the nineteenth century has been an indispensable leaven in 
the growth of mathematics ever since. It is a fact, though, that these syllo- 
gistic formulations have not directly affected age-old conceptions of conti- 
nuity in some descriptive sciences, especially in earth and life sciences, in 
which presumptions of continuity have been of the very essence from the 
first. This may help to  explain why a new generation of investigators spear- 
headed by Ren i  Thom and C.H. Waddington [73] has been introducing 
radically new mathematical paradigms into these disciplines. 
It is of course obvious that continuity is the backbone of any evolutionary 
theory. But continuity had been present, in a descriptive non-evolutionary 
manner, long before Darwin, in the conception of a Great Chain of Being, 
which had been perceived by Aristotle, and was advocated with special ar- 
dor by Leibniz. The standard reference for this subject matter is Lovejoy 
[54] ,  whom I have cited before [ lo ,  pp. 498-5001. 
Aristotle merely said that "Nature passes little by little from things life- 
less to animal life, so that, by continuity, it is impossible to  present the exact 
lines of demarcation, or to  determine to which of the two groups intermedi- 
ate forms belong." But the Great Chain of Being in Leibniz can be briefly 
described thus: "All the order of natural beings form but a single chain in 
which the various classes, like so many rings, are so closely linked one to  
another that it is impossible for the senses or  the imagination to determine 
precisely the point at which one ends and the next begins." Leibniz also 
equated the adjective "great" in the Great Chain variously with "maxi- 
mal," "optimal," "perfect," "complete," and "continuous," thus subor- 
dinating it to his Law of Continuity. Leibniz obviously shut his eyes, and 
perhaps even his mind, to the very simple verity, which was clearly recog- 
nized by the redoubtable Dr. Samuel Johnson, that a Great Chain of Being, 
however "complete," cannot be "continuous" because each individual 
"link" in the chain is isolated, meaning that it has a neighbor that is hier- 
archically above it, and another that is hierarchically below it. 
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This kind of disparity between physical actuality and mathematical possi- 
bility began to be much more significant and pronounced after evolutionary 
outlooks began to demand everybody's attention 110, 59, and I]. In 1837 
the leading historian of science, William Whewell, in his History of the In- 
ductive Sciences, coined the name unifortnitarianism for hypotheses of con- 
tinuity peculiar to geology and catastrophistn for its contrary. For geology, 
and also biology, and even linguistics, uniformitarianism asserts that there 
has been a certain continuity of evolution since the formation of the Earth. 
But no satisfactory definition of this continuity has been agreed upon. The 
indecision is largely a substantive one, in that the demand of continuity may 
mean different things purely geologically. But it is also a fact that rnathe- 
matically uniformitarianism, in almost any of its versions, is a compound of 
continuity proper, strict constancy, and even cyclicity, and that there is no 
"special" mathematical conception of continuity by which to bring about 
some kind of "synthesis" or conflation of the various aspects of uniformi- 
tarianism by sheer force of mathematical intervention, as it came about in 
the seventeenth century when Newton's definitions of momentum and 
force, based on those of velocity and acceleration, made an end to uncer- 
tainties and inconsistencies in the work of Galileo and others. 
Even in general phiIosophy a similar phenomenon can be observed. I 
have described (in [I0 and 1.51) how the eminent American philosopher 
Charles Sanders Peirce-whose basic academic training was in mathematics 
with subsequent durable achievements in algebra of logic-strove to formu- 
late a universal law of continuity, which he termed Synechism, for the gov- 
ernance of the universe; but he was not able to arrive at such a universal 
law, strenuous efforts notwithstanding. Peirce knew quite well that there 
are ineluctable discontinuities in the world, and he even adumbrated the 
fundamental discontinuity inherent to the world picture of quantum phys- 
ics. But he was also a philosopher, very much so, and a philosopher has to 
have an integrated system of Thought and thoughts, and there can be no 
such system without a measure of continuity of some kind of another. 
Peirce was thoroughly familiar with the Dedekind-Cantor continuity of his 
time, and he probably also knew a good part of the theory of real variables 
of his time. But apparently none of his Iabors would assist and guide him in 
his quest for a principle of continuity on which to  erect a comprehensive 
philosophical structure of his own. 
VIII .  POST-ANALYSIS NUMBER THEORY AND ALGEBRA 
I have stated repeatedly that in the case of astronomy, geometry, optics, 
and also mechanics the irruption of background space and of other appurte- 
nances of analysis into their texture took place rather suddenly around 
1600, and that the effect was instantaneous and unmistakable. 
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In the case of number theory, I am not sufficiently familiar with the tex- 
ture of the subject matter to  be able to  judge what it was specifically that 
made the number theory of Fermat and John Wallis different from t h a t ~ f  
Euclid and Diophantus, and how to  attribute the differences, such as they 
were, to an upsurge of analysis. My cursory reading would suggest that, al- 
though there palpably was a change of outlook, spirit, and intellectual moti- 
vation, still the achievements of Fermat and Wallis themselves might con- 
ceivably have come about in the idiom and with the resources of antiquity 
(although the formulation of the Fermat conjecture regardingxn + y n  = z n  
for "all" and therefore arbitrary large natural numbers n might have strain- 
ed the perceptions of a Diophantus to the limit). 
But in the eighteenth century a number theory of a genuinely analytical 
affiliation and orientation began to take shape. The Goldbach conjecture 
and the Waring problem may sound deceptively pre-analytical, but their so- 
lutions, complete or partial, have thus far been swathed in analysis. 
Furthermore, in the eighteenth century an extremely recondite arithmeti- 
cal problem has been posed, however indirectly, which can be stated only 
within analysis itself. One of Euler's finest triumphs is the formula, k I 1 , 
in which the BZk are rational numbers, so-called Bernoulli numbers, which 
are given by 
t 
- -  
et - 1 - C,, 4 t k ,  k! 
see, for instance, [46, pp. 449-4521). There is absolutely nothing corres- 
ponding to (8) known for the odd-powered sums 
and particularly irritating is the "limiting" case k = 0. In this case the ser- 
ies (9) does not converge. But, as already found by Euler, the limit 
exists, and is a positive fractional number, approximately y = 0.577218 
. . . . It is embarrassing to have to say that nothing arithmetical is known 
about this number, not even whether it is rational or irrational. There is cer- 
tainly a problem for some future generations to attend to. 
Of pivotal consequence to the future of number theory was another 
achievement of Euler, his creation of the function 
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as a holomorphic extension of the factorial function n! from the domain of 
integers to the domain of complex numbers, the extension being 
( 1  1) I'(n + 1 )  = n! , r ( s  + 1 )  = s ~ ( s ) .  
Now, this function r ( s )  appears, without any number-theoretic rhyme or 
reason, in the Riemann function equation 
(12) S 1 - s  I - $  r(-)n-* ((s)  = r( - ) a 2 7  ( ( 1 - S )  , 2 2 
that is 
(13) A ( s ) t ( s )  = A ( l - s ) < ( l - ~ )  ,
where 
S 5 (14) A(s) = I '(-)r-T , 2 
and the renowned "Zeta function" 
( 1 5 )  1 = El 2 
admits the Euler product 
(16) 1 { ( s )  = I-I,, ( 1  -y)-l  P ' 
the index p running over all primes. 
Presumably, the two relations (12) and (16) between them hold the key to 
the secret of  the Riemann hypothesis; and this places the gamma function, 
as a participant in (12), into the very midst of the intriguing number-theo- 
retic setting that the two relations create and represent. But from looking at 
the integral (10) directly, and surveying the properties of the gamma func- 
tion as emanating from it, one would never suspect it of being involved in 
such a highly charged context. Except for being outwardly involved in (12), 
and in a plethora of other functional equations of a similar structure- 
which were devised by Dirichlet, Dedekind, Erich Hecke, Carl Ludwig 
Siege1, Max Koecher, and others-the gamma function is really a humdrum 
function with very '"redictablew properties. As G.W. Hardy said casuaIly, 
he was never held up in his research by not being able to  decide a specific 
question relating to  the behavior of the gamma function. And I have never 
heard it said that in developing the standard theory of the gamma function a 
piece of syllogism can be modified or illuminated by a number-theoretic ar- 
gument. Thus Euler's gamma function is an opaque piece of "hard-rock" 
analysis indispensably lodged among sparkling "jewels" of number theory. 
Another gift from analysis to  number theory, even grander, was the very 
mechanism by which the Riemann functional equation and then numerous 
other functional equations were established, a t  first indirectly and then ever 
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more directly. The gift was a piece of Fourier analysis, which the twentieth 
century has named the Poisson summation formula, but which was intro- 
duced into number theory in the first half of the nineteenth century by Le- 
jeune DirichIet, who may have learned it while studying in  Paris as a youl'ng 
man from Joseph Fourier himself. Dirichlet's own application of the Pois- 
son summation formula was to the theory of Gaussian Sr~rns (see [4, pp. 
146-187; also 61). An exposition of the theory of Gaussian Sums in Wecke 
[43, pp. 235-2481 features a contribution of Cauchy, who applied his "res- 
idue formula" to it. As already stated before [15, pp. 832-8331, the Poisson 
summation formula and Cauchy's integral and residue formulas are two 
different aspects of a comprehensive broad-gauged duality formula which 
lies athwart most of analysis. 
The Poisson summation formula does not establish the Riemann-type 
functional equations themselves, but only "intermediate" theta relations 
which were the creation of Jacobi; and theta relations lead to functional 
equations by way of the so-called Mellin Transform. The Poisson summa- 
tion formula did grow with its application to analytic number theory and is 
being gradually "identified" with it. Hecke's application of the formula to 
situations in E" (in his memoirs, articles 7, 8, 12, and 14 in [43]) was 
n-dimensional Fourier analysis of high order, and the part of i t  represented 
in Landau [52] is only a foretaste of it (see also the Appendix in [5]). After 
that, extensions of the formula to non-Euclidean settings, in work by Andre' 
Weil and also by Atle Selberg (Selberg trace formula) have even "algebri- 
fied" the formula to an extent. The broadest settings of the formula and of 
correspondingly broad functional equations have been initiated in the doc- 
toral thesis of J.T. Tate (see [27, pp. 305-3471). But when we come down to 
the original Hecke cases, the gamma function remains the deus ex t7zachinn 
as before. 
We may conclude with a few remarks on algebra itself. According to Otto 
Neugebauer, algebra started quite early in the West; what the Babylonians 
had before the Greeks was mainly algebra rather than geometry. Similarly, 
after the Middle Ages, algebra resumed with the algebra of polynomials of 
third or fourth degree long before analysis started properly around 1600. 
And yet, after this promising beginning, as if deferring its development to 
that of analysis, the algebra of polynominals stood virtually still for about 
two-and-a-half centuries, and after preliminaries by Lagrange and Gauss 
prominently started up again in the nineteenth century with the work of 
Abel and GaIois. Even though to a twentieth-century algebraist the work of 
Galois is apparently lucid and comprehensible, in the nineteenth century it 
was reputed to be obscure and recondite. Until after World War I there 
were very few textbooks in algebra from which the Galois theory could be 
conveniently learned; but until books like van der Waerden's Algebra began 
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to appear, a very accessible text from which an analyst could learn it was a 
chapter in Picard's Traitkd'Analyse. 
While the syllogistic formalization of artalysis was started in the early 
nineteenth century, the corresponding formalization of algebra was a hun- 
dred years behind (only after World War 1 did a textbook in algebra dare to 
introduce concepts like fields, rings, ideals, etc., in relatively early chap- 
ters). This observation was made to me around 1930 by the leading analyst 
C. Carathe'odory, who also had intended to put i t  in print in some publica- 
tion ic /'occasion, but was prevented from doing so by a fellow editor of the 
planned publication, a young algebraist of the Emmy Noether school who 
was outraged by this kind of judgment. Yet Carathe'odory was right. For in- 
stance, when E. Steinitz in a memoir in 1910 introduced the concept of a 
characteristic for a general commutative field and showed that it can be 0 or 
a positive prime, this was considered something of a milestone. But this 
construction was hardly more innovative than a Weierstrass continuous 
function which is nowhere differentiable, let alone a Cantor non-constant 
monotone continuous function which has a zero derivative almost every- 
where, both of which were discovered long before. 
I think i t  can be said that during the three centuries 1615-1915 analysis 
was blazing the trails, with algebra somehow following along. After 1915 al- 
gebra was beginning t o  catch up, and in the second half of the twentieth 
century it has even happened that certain partial algebraizations of analysis 
have taken place, at least ostensibly. But this last phenomenon belongs not 
to the "emergence" of analysis but to its "maturing," and so we need nor 
concern ourselves with it. 
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